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Abstract
This paper provides a general model for the study of strategic knowledge sharing
in any ﬁnite Bayesian game. Unlike earlier papers on strategic information revelation,
higher-order uncertainties can be incorporated into the model. We propose an equilib-
rium concept, called knowledge equilibrium, which takes into account voluntary, public,
and decentralized communication possibilities of exogenously certiﬁable statements. After
the communication stage, beliefs are explicitly deduced from consistent possibility corre-
spondences, without making reference to sequences of perturbed games. Several properties
of knowledge equilibria and revised knowledge are examined. In particular, it is shown
that a knowledge equilibrium is always a sequential equilibrium of the associated extensive
form game with communication.
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Knowledge revision; Consistent beliefs.
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1 Introduction
Interactive decision situations, or simply games, are usually based on an endogenous knowledge
structure. Indeed, agents’ uncertainty can be modiﬁed and reduced through the information
reﬂection of aggregated variables (like a price system), by individual experimentation, or by
the observation of other agents’ actions. In some circumstances, knowledge can also be directly
exchanged via verbal or written revelations. In this case, by communicating voluntarily with
each other, agents can actively modify the information structure of the game they are playing,
even if the strategic context does not involve, a priori, any possibility of information exchange.
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1This paper is concerned with strategic and direct knowledge sharing in incomplete infor-
mation games. More precisely, we add, to any given Bayesian game (or game with diﬀerential
information), a ﬁrst stage of non-cooperative communication which is not modeled in the
basic interactive decision situation. Several assumptions will be made concerning the features
of communication. Among them, we require that only truthful—but possibly very vague—
revelations are allowed. That is, players are free to make uninformative, partially informative,
or complete disclosures concerning their own information, but they cannot disclose knowledge
they do not possess. This is possible if, e.g., information can be certiﬁed, proved, or veriﬁed,
or if there exists injuries against lying agents. The truth telling constraint is also justiﬁed
if players are able to transmit exogenous messages they initially received from the “external
world”. Since these exogenous messages allowed them to construct their initial knowledge (i.e.,
they allowed them to exclude some states of the world), they might also convey information
to other players when they are transmitted.1 A second important assumption concerns the
mechanism of communication. Communication is assumed direct in the sense that there is
no centralized mechanism to ensure knowledge sharing. In particular, players cannot commit
to exchange information before they actually receive it. Finally, we assume that information
revelation does not directly aﬀect players’ payoﬀs, but only the information structure. This
excludes, e.g., communication through the observation of others’ payoﬀ-relevant actions in a
sequential game, or indirect communication through a price system.
Considering direct and strategic communication is important for at least three reasons.
First, it may radically aﬀect the outcomes predicted with solution concepts like the Bayesian–
Nash equilibrium, where the knowledge structure is ﬁxed throughout the analysis. Hence,
pre-play and voluntary knowledge sharing is of great interest for applied game-theoretical re-
searches since, in many economic, legal, political or ﬁnancial models, an exogenous information
is assumed, but seems often inappropriate in real-world problems. Second, such an analysis
provides some characterizations of endogenous information structures which are likely to arise
in practice. For example, it helps to characterize kinds of incomplete information games in
which distributed knowledge can become common knowledge through voluntary disclosures.
Finally, it enables to study players’ strategic behavior and knowledge updating when the
information structure can be manipulated.
Game-theoretical papers dealing with voluntary knowledge sharing are suggestive, but
still new and far from being deﬁnitive. The pioneering contributions made on the topic of
strategic information revelation with provable (or certiﬁable, veriﬁable) statements are models
of persuasion from a seller to a buyer where the seller can reveal or conceal the quality of
his product at no cost. This literature has been initiated by Grossman (1981) and Milgrom
(1981) who showed that the seller is not able to mislead the potential buyer about the quality
of his product, even in a monopolistic market without reputation possibilities. Other papers
generalized this result by considering that full certiﬁable disclosure is not possible, or that
many interested groups are involved, in sometimes more general contexts (see, e.g., Milgrom
and Roberts, 1986; Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990; Shin, 1994a,b; Lipman and Seppi, 1995). In
a game-theoretical point of view, Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) extended substantially these
models because they considered many privately informed decision makers, whereas in all
other papers the decision maker is assumed completely uninformed. Hence, they provided
a model of strategic information revelation for “real” incomplete information games (with
at least two asymmetrically informed decision makers), in which all players may have some
information to disclose before choosing an action. In particular, they gave some commonly
1Other justiﬁcations and various examples may be found in the literature in the ﬁeld of persuasion and
communication games; see (among others) Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981), Milgrom and Roberts (1986),
Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura (1990), Shin (1994a,b), Lipman and Seppi (1995), Seidmann and
Winter (1997), and Glazer and Rubinstein (2001).
2analyzed duopoly examples with incomplete information (e.g., about ﬁrms’ production costs or
demand functions) where their assumptions were, or were not, suﬃcient for perfect revelation.
It is worth mentioning that this literature diﬀers from the literature on cheap talk games,
i.e., sender-receiver games where non-binding, non-certiﬁable and costless communication
takes place before the receiver chooses his action.2 The equilibrium set is always enlarged
by cheap talk because all messages can be sent whatever the information senders have, i.e.,
messages have no intrinsic meaning and prove nothing. In particular, every game of costless
and non-certiﬁable communication has “babbling” equilibria, where messages are ignored. In
Section 5 we discuss how the model developed in this paper could be modiﬁed in order to
allow cheap talk communication.
As far as we know, existing studies on strategic information revelation consider informa-
tion structures with uncorrelated types, which implies that beliefs (probabilities assignments)
about others’ knowledge are common to all agents. In particular, there is surprisingly no
attempt to study strategic information revelation in environments with higher-order uncer-
tainty (i.e., uncertainty about others’ knowledge).3 It is well known, however, that interactive
knowledge and higher-order uncertainty play a crucial role in interactive decision situations.4
As matter stands, the explicit evolution of information structures and of interactive knowledge
was only studied with exogenous and mandatory communication, in the literature about the
emergence of common knowledge and consensus (see, e.g., Aumann, 1976; Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis, 1982; Parikh and Krasucki, 1990; Krasucki, 1996). In short, it was shown that,
by communicating, agents may agree and reach a consensus about their claims and beliefs.
The analysis was ﬁrst done with perfectly reliable communication about posterior probabili-
ties. It was shown that the communication of posterior probabilities continues until they are
equal and common knowledge. The study of more general information exchange also leads,
with some assumptions on the communication protocol and on the type of sent messages,
to such a consensus. However, in these models, strategic consideration is completely absent
because agents are not involved in any game.5
This paper is an attempt to “mix” the strategic approach to information disclosure and
the approach on exogenous communication protocols in environments with higher-order uncer-
tainty. More precisely, we develop a general game-theoretical model in which, before playing
a Bayesian game with a partitional information structure, players can publicly and costlessly
exchange exogenously certiﬁable information in a ﬁrst stage game. Information revelation is
done at an interim stage (i.e., after each one got his initial private information) and voluntarily.
In this framework, we construct an equilibrium concept, called knowledge equilibrium, in which
revision rules and updated information structures are obtained from knowledge consistency
conditions. We examine several characterizations of players’ communication possibilities, revi-
sion rules and updated knowledge, and we study the properties of the resulting payoﬀ-relevant
strategies and equilibria. Since we use the information partition approach to model the diﬀer-
ential information rather than the type set approach, we are able to eliminate the independent
type assumption made in previous work on strategic information revelation.
In consequence, our model of strategic information revelation extends most of previous
2See, e.g., Crawford and Sobel (1982), and Farrell and Rabin (1996). A larger class of games, information
structures, and communication possibilities allowing many communication stages are considered, e.g., by Forges
(1990) and Ben-Porath (2001). The perspective of this literature diﬀers however from ours.
3Shin (1994a,b) considered a particular information structure in which a decision maker does not know the
interested party’s knowledge about fundamental states. However, the depth of knowledge of the information
structure does not exceed one.
4See, e.g., the surveys of Geanakoplos (1994) and Morris and Shin (2000) to name just a few.
5An inﬂuential strand in the computer science literature has also examined knowledge and communication
with hierarchical knowledge reasoning (see, e.g. Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi, 1995). However, to the best
of our knowledge, none of these contributions try to integrate agents’ incentives to share knowledge.
3papers, since any information structure, Bayesian game, and certiﬁability possibility can be
considered. The only restrictions is that we do not allow repeated and networked communi-
cation, and the state space must be ﬁnite.6 As shown, substantial diﬃculties arise from these
generalizations, particularly in characterizing beliefs when unexpected messages are received.
To deal with these diﬃculties by keeping the analysis and possible applications tractable, we
deﬁne knowledge consistency conditions for revised information by relying on explicit “epis-
temic” inferences. These inferences are carried out without reference to the sequences of
trembles used to deﬁne a sequential equilibrium. Interestingly, our conditions imply Kreps
and Wilson’s (1982) consistency conditions. Nevertheless, with such a “standard” approach
without bounded rationality, it is shown that, outside equilibrium, second stage information
structures over the set of states of the world do not necessarily satisfy truth (non delusion) and
introspection axioms of knowledge, except for some particular conﬁgurations. Hence, outside
the equilibrium path, a player’s information cannot necessarily be represented by a parti-
tion of the state space because unexpected messages may yield many possible and reasonable
interpretations.
In short, updated knowledge in the second stage game, after all messages have been re-
ceived, are constructed using the following inference rule. Each player, given the vector of
messages received from the others, veriﬁes if there exists an equilibrium (expected) vector of
messages which is compatible with the actual messages in one state he considers as possible.
In that case, there is either no deviation in the communication stage or the deviation is not
observable by the player. Hence, he applies Bayes’ rule by inverting all players’ communica-
tion strategies. Otherwise, he knows that at least one player has deviated. If he can identify
the player who has deviated, then he continues to apply Bayes’ rule on others’ communication
strategies, and excludes the states in which the identiﬁed deviant is the most likely to deviate.
If a non-degenerated set of players might be the potential deviants, then the same procedure
is performed by considering the deviant player as the potential deviant which is the most
likely to deviate. The “most likely” relations are common to all players, which ensures that
this procedure generates a sequential equilibrium. As shown, however, given that players are
endowed with diﬀerent initial information, they can make entirely diﬀerent interpretations
from a vector of messages. For example, they may not observe the same deviations, they may
not identify the same deviant, and they may not exclude the same states of the world in which
a deviant is the most likely to deviate. In our knowledge, such a construction is in itself a
substantial originality and richness of our model comparing to previous papers on strategic
information revelation.
In Section 2 we present the general framework of this paper. First, we describe the initial
information structure and the initial Bayesian game based on it. Second, we construct the
communication stage (ﬁrst stage game) and we characterize communication possibilities and
strategies. Then, we present the second stage game in which the initial Bayesian game is played
according to players’ ﬁrst stage communication choices. Finally, we deﬁne the sequential
equilibrium of the complete two-stage communication game.
In Section 3 we introduce an alternative equilibrium, called knowledge equilibrium. Con-
trary to the sequential equilibrium approach, we consider outside equilibrium information
structures in terms of possibility correspondences such that outside equilibrium beliefs are
simply obtained by applying Bayes’ rule on them. To restrict outside equilibrium beliefs, we
elaborate some natural restrictions for the possibility correspondences obtained outside the
equilibrium path. The cognitive requirements behind the conditions we impose are explicitly
deﬁned in terms of players’ inferences about possible worlds. In addition, we explicitly char-
acterize observable and identiﬁable deviations, and we demonstrate some properties of second
6Multi-stage communication has been considered by Lipman and Seppi (1995) with one decision maker and
symmetrically informed interested parties.
4stage information structures.
In Section 4 we compare knowledge and sequential equilibria. First, we show that a
knowledge equilibrium is always a sequential equilibrium of the two-stage communication
game. That is, the conditions on beliefs generated by our possibility correspondences satisfy
Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) consistency condition in the associated extensive form game. A
very simple example proves, however, that a sequential equilibrium may not be a knowledge
equilibrium. In this example, the diﬀerence stems from the fact that there is only a ﬁnite set of
possible outside equilibrium beliefs which can be generated from possibility correspondences
and prior probabilities. Other examples of revised information are presented to illustrate
the additional requirements we impose on outside equilibrium beliefs. These additional re-
quirements result from the fact that players only consider unilateral deviations as possible, a
restriction which is not imposed by Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) consistency condition. However,
some conditions ensuring the equivalence of the two approaches are developed.
Section 5 concludes by a discussion and gives some lines for further researches and de-
velopments. We have collected the main technical proofs, lemmas, and constructions in the
Appendices. Applications to some classes of games and information structures are investigated
in a companion paper (Koessler, 2002).
2 General Framework
In this section we describe a general class of initial information structures and Bayesian games,
and we construct the pre-play communication stage in which agents strategically modify the
initial Bayesian game through their inﬂuence on its information structure. The spirit of
the equilibrium of the complete game will be to require that information disclosures of the
ﬁrst stage game of communication are optimal and that every proﬁle of strategies of the
“continuation Bayesian games” generated by communication forms a Bayesian equilibrium.7
2.1 Initial Information Structure and Bayesian Game
We consider a measure space (Ω;F;p), where Ω is a ﬁnite state space (the set of states of
the world), F is a ¾-algebra of events on Ω, and p is a full-support probability distribution
on Ω, i.e., p(!) > 0 for all ! 2 Ω. The power set 2Ω is the set of subsets (or events) of Ω.
A state ! characterizes the fundamentals of the game (e.g., players’ preferences), as well as
players’ uncertainty about the fundamentals and about others’ knowledge. The probability
distribution p determines players’ common priors about the states of the world.
Let N = f1;:::;ng be the ﬁnite set of players (n ¸ 2), and let hi : Ω ! 2Ωnf;g be player i’s
initial information function. We denote by h = (hi)i2N the initial information structure on Ω.
It gives exactly how knowledge is distributed between players. It is assumed that the initial
information structure is partitional and correct, that is, fhi(!) : ! 2 Ωg forms a partition Hi
of Ω and ! 2 hi(!) for all ! 2 Ω and i 2 N.8 Therefore, the initial information structure
can also be described by the n-tuple of partitions H = (Hi)i2N. The initial information set
(partition cell) hi(!) of player i at ! is the element of Hi containing !. When player i is at
an information set hi(!), he cannot distinguish the states in it. In other words, he knows that
a corresponding state is realized but he cannot say which one.
7Of course, these continuation Bayesian games will not be proper subgames since they do not stem from a
singleton information set.
8This last requirement is equivalent to the truth axiom in epistemic models: what an agent knows for sure
is always true. Actually, the knowledge structure behind this modeling is a strong epistemic model, which
mainly corresponds to the epistemic logic S5.
5Strategic concerns are introduced by considering an initial Bayesian game in which each
player i has a ﬁnite set of eﬀective or payoﬀ-relevant actions Ai and a von Neumann Mor-
genstern utility function ui : A £ Ω ! R, where A =
Q
i2N Ai.9 This Bayesian game is
characterized by a tuple G ´ hN;Ω;p;h;A;(ui)i2Ni. We will add a ﬁrst strategic com-
munication stage which can modify the initial information structure h of this game. By
G(h0) ´ hN;Ω;p;h0;A;(ui)i2Ni we denote the Bayesian game which is the same as G, except
that the information structure is h0 instead of h.
Having deﬁned initial information structures and Bayesian games, we turn to the def-
initions of strategies and equilibria of such Bayesian games. We denote by ∆(Ai) the set
of probability distributions over Ai. A (mixed) strategy of player i in the Bayesian game
G is given by a Hi measurable function Ái : Ω ! ∆(Ai). A proﬁle of strategies of G is
given by Á = (Ái)i2N 2 Φ =
Q
i2N Φi, where Φi is player i’s set of strategies in G. We
shall sometimes write Φi(h) and Φ(h) to specify the information structure we consider. With
some abuse of notations, utility functions ui are naturally extended to mixed strategies of
G by ui(Á;!) =
P
a2A Á(a j !)ui(a;!). Then, player i’s expected utility when he is at his
information set hi(!) and the strategy proﬁle Á 2 Φ is used is given by






















Accordingly, Á 2 Φ(h) is a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium of G(h) if for all i 2 N and ! 2 Ω
we have10
Ui(Á j hi(!)) ¸ Ui(ai;Á¡i j hi(!)); 8 ai 2 Ai: (2)
We denote the set of equilibria of G(h) by Φ¤(h) µ Φ(h). Since ﬁnite Bayesian games are
investigated, we have Φ¤(h) 6= ; for all initial information structures h on Ω.
In order to modify the information structure h, players will be able to share their knowledge
by communicating information about Ω in a ﬁrst stage game. Then, the proﬁle of actions a 2 A
can be modiﬁed because a new Bayesian game will eventually be played (new in the sense that
the information structure has changed via communication). Communication will modify the
expected utility of a player through the direct modiﬁcation of his information and through
the modiﬁcation of the action proﬁle. We will impose that such a proﬁle of actions is chosen
optimally for each information structure that could be generated by communication. Given
these “subgame” decisions, players will compare their utility for each information structure
and will try to generate their most favorable information structure by communicating non-
cooperatively with each other.
2.2 Communication Stage
Before the Bayesian game G is played, but after each player received his private information,
we allow players to publicly and simultaneously send one explicit message containing some of
9Finiteness of actions’ sets is not necessary in our model. We only need the existence of a Bayesian–Nash
equilibrium for each information structure on Ω. This is automatically veriﬁed with ﬁnite sets of actions. If
the sets (Ai)i2N are inﬁnite, some usual conditions on the utility functions and the actions space are needed
for the existence of a second stage Bayesian equilibrium. Finiteness of the state space is however required.
10Standard game-theoretical conventions are used throughout the paper. In particular, for any variable, we
denote its proﬁle over all agents except that of player i by the corresponding letter with subscript ¡i. With
some abuse of notation, ai will sometimes denote the strategy assigning probability one to the action ai.
6their private information. As will be seen, allowing only one message to be sent is without
loss of generality (see Remark 1).11 Information is certiﬁed since only truthful reports are
allowed. Formally, each player i, when he is at his information set hi(!), chooses to reveal
an event xi µ Ω to all the other players. The condition that sent information xi of player i
at ! is true is formally equivalent to hi(!) µ xi.12 Said diﬀerently, player i can reveal xi at
! only if he knows xi at !. In such a setting, each player can exactly reveal what he knows,
just a part, or nothing, but he cannot reveal information he does not possess. In other words,
agents must tell the truth, but not necessarily the whole truth. This assumption is called the
certiﬁability assumption.
For the purpose of characterizing communication possibilities, let Yi be the ¾-algebra
generated by Hi, minus the empty set. That is, Yi is the family of all unions of events in Hi.
For any i 2 N and ! 2 Ω, the set Yi(!) ´ fyi 2 Yi : ! 2 yig contains relevant knowledge
player i has at !.13 More precisely, Yi(!) is the set of player i’s self-evident events containing
!.14 Let Xi µ Yi be a set of messages (in terms of events) such that Xi [ f;g is a set of
events closed under intersection. What player i can reveal at ! 2 Ω is given by the subset
Xi(!) = fxi 2 Xi : ! 2 xig of Yi(!). Let Y =
Q
i2N Yi, X =
Q
i2N Xi, Y = (Yi)i2N, and
denote by X = (Xi)i2N the general level of certiﬁability. This certiﬁability level characterizes
the preciseness of information that can be transmitted by each player at each state of the world.
It is reasonable to impose that Ω 2 Xi(!) for all ! 2 Ω and i 2 N (i.e., Ω 2 Xi for all i 2 N),
which means that players always have the possibility to reveal nothing. This assumption can
be dropped easily in order to analyze, e.g., the eﬀect of mandatory communication which
limit players’ discretion.15 The following proposition results directly from the modeling of
certiﬁability and from the correctness of the initial information structure.
Proposition 1 If player i can reveal xi at ! (i.e., xi 2 Xi(!)), then player i knows xi at !
(i.e., hi(!) µ xi) and xi is true at ! (i.e., ! 2 xi).
Proof. Obvious. ¤
Remark 1 Assuming that Yi[f;g is a ¾-algebra and that Xi[f;g is closed under intersection
is without loss of generality. If Yi [f;g is not a ¾-algebra but also contains all events player i
can possibly know (i.e., events of the set fE µ Ω : 9 ! 2 Ω s.t. hi(!) µ Eg), then revealing
such an event is tantamount to revealing an event of Yi since others can infer player i’s
information sets in which this revelation is possible. The reason is that players’ partitions
are known by each other (see also Example 1 on page 9). On the other hand, if Xi [ f;g is
not closed under intersection, this means that there are two events E and F in Xi such that
E \ F 6= ; and E \ F = 2 Xi. But then, it suﬃces that player i sends both E and F to certify
the event E \ F. Nonetheless, Xi might not be closed under union (or complementation).
Indeed, there are many instances in which it is possible to prove a fact, but it is not possible
to prove that a fact is not true. This arises, for example, if players are only able to certify
fundamental (payoﬀ-relevant) events,16 but are not always informed about them.
11However, sequential communication may markedly complicate the model.
12Since the initial information structure is correct (! 2 hi(!) for all i 2 N and ! 2 Ω), an event initially
perceived as true by an agent is eﬀectively true.
13An illustration of these objects is given in Example 1 on page 9.
14A self-evident event (or truism) for player i is an event which is known by player i whenever it occurs.
That is, hi(!) µ E for all ! 2 E or, equivalently, f! 2 Ω : hi(!) µ Eg = E. Such an event cannot happen
unless player i knows it.
15An analysis of limited discretion in information disclosure has been reported in a persuasion game by
Fishman and Hagerty (1990).
16Fundamental or payoﬀ-relevant events are events of the ¾-algebra generated by the set of utility functions
(ui)i2N.
7The certiﬁability level is called perfect if X = Y (i.e., X = Y). When certiﬁability is
perfect, players can reveal any piece of knowledge they have. If Xi(!) = fΩg for all i 2 N
and ! 2 Ω, the certiﬁability level is null, which implies that communication is irrelevant.
Indeed, if each player is only able to send the same message whatever his information set,
then the information structure is unchanged and the game with communication is equivalent
to the initial Bayesian game G. On the contrary, when players send diﬀerent messages, they
anticipate the eﬀect on the information structure and on players’ behaviors in the second stage
game.
The following proposition shows that if xi 2 Xi is revealed by player i, then the set of
states X¡1
i (xi) ´ f!0 2 Ω : xi 2 Xi(!0)g in which this player can send xi is exactly the set
xi. Thus, when xi is revealed by player i at !, other players learn that the real state is in xi.
Therefore, the set xi can be interpreted as the pure informational content of the message xi.
Consequently, a message x0
i µ xi is, according to its pure informational content, at least as
informative as xi.17
Proposition 2 For any certiﬁability level X, any player i 2 N, and any message xi 2 Xi,
the pure informational content of the message xi is the event xi itself. That is, X¡1
i (xi) ´
f! 2 Ω : xi 2 Xi(!)g = xi.
Proof. On the one hand, if ! 2 X¡1
i (xi) then xi 2 Xi(!). But, by deﬁnition, ! 2 x0
i for
all x0
i 2 Xi(!). Thus, ! 2 xi. On the other hand, if ! = 2 X¡1
i (xi) then xi = 2 Xi(!). This
means that ! = 2 xi or xi = 2 Xi. Since xi 2 Xi (by assumption), we necessarily have ! = 2 xi. ¤
Remark 2 A diﬀerent but equivalent formalization of certiﬁability is to consider a set of
available messages which are not in terms of events, but which also diﬀer at each player’s
information set (see, e.g., Lipman and Seppi, 1995; Seidmann and Winter, 1997). From our
point of view the modeling of messages in terms of events is more natural and convenient
because messages have a direct and explicit semantical content. Moreover, what is certiﬁable
is very easy to characterize. Indeed, from the previous proposition, an event E is certiﬁable
by player i iff E 2 Xi, and a message E 2 Xi simply certiﬁes the event E. Finally, the
certiﬁability level corresponds to a rich language in the sense of Seidmann and Winter (1997)
if X = Y, i.e., if the certiﬁability level is perfect.
Besides adapting the certiﬁability level to the context analyzed (e.g., by allowing only some
agents to communicate, or by allowing only payoﬀ-relevant events to be certiﬁed), allowing
partial certiﬁability is interesting owing to its impact on communication behaviors and on
knowledge sharing possibilities. Indeed, for distributed knowledge to be perfectly shared not
all information has to be certiﬁable. To see this, consider two players with the partitions H1 =
ff!1g;f!2;!3gg and H2 = ff!1;!2g;f!3gg, and assume that at !2 player 1 reveals f!2;!3g
and player 2 reveals f!1;!2g. In this case, both players necessarily know that the event
f!2g = f!1;!2g \ f!2;!3g is true, even if it cannot be certiﬁed and is not initially known by
any player.18 What is more, a certiﬁability level may be suﬃcient to share all knowledge when
communication is mandatory, but such knowledge sharing might be obtained strategically only
with more certiﬁability possibilities. Such a phenomenon can be obtained, e.g., in persuasion
games or Cournot games with communication and incomplete information about fundamentals
and about others’ knowledge about the fundamentals. Indeed, in such games, payoﬀ-relevant
certiﬁability is not always suﬃcient to get a perfectly revealing equilibrium, although full
17According to an equilibrium informational content, this is not necessarily true. Indeed, when communica-
tion is strategic, the informativeness of a message can go beyond its pure informational content.
18Of course, an event which is learnt is necessarily “distributed knowledge”, i.e., it must be a superset of an
event belonging to the ¾-algebra generated by the Join,
W
i2N Hi, of players’ initial partitions.
8certiﬁability leads to complete knowledge sharing (see Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990; Shin,
1994a).
In the following example we illustrate diﬀerent certiﬁability possibilities.
Example 1 Let Ω = f!1;!2;!3;!4;!5;!6g be the set of states of the world, and let H1 =
ff!1;!2g;f!3;!4g;f!5;!6gg be player 1’s partition. We get
Y1(!1) = ff!1;!2g;f!1;!2;!3;!4g;f!1;!2;!5;!6g;Ωg:
Events of Y1(!1) are player 1’s self-evident events containing !1. They represent all rele-
vant information player 1 has at !1 because revealing another (true) event for him at !1 is
equivalent to revealing an event of Y1(!1). For example, revealing respectively f!1;!2;!3g and
f!1;!2;!3;!4;!5g is equivalent to revealing respectively f!1;!2g and f!1;!2;!3;!4g. Indeed,
the certiﬁability assumption implies that if player 1 reveals x1 at !1, then h1(!1) µ x1. Thus,
if f!1;!2;!3g is revealed, then receivers know that h1(!1) = f!1;!2g. If f!1;!2;!3;!4;!5g
is revealed, then they know that h1(!1) µ f!1;!2;!3;!4g. If we posit that X1(!1) =
ff!1;!2;!3;!4g;Ωg, then player 1 can only reveal that his information set belongs to one of the
events in X1(!1). He cannot certify that he knows f!1;!2g or that he knows f!1;!2;!5;!6g,
but he can certify that he knows f!1;!2;!3;!4g or he can certify nothing (i.e., Ω).
Deﬁnition 1 A pure communication strategy for player i is a Hi measurable function ci :
Ω ! Xi such that ci(!) 2 Xi(!) for all ! 2 Ω. A mixed communication strategy for player i
is a Hi measurable function ¼i : Ω ! ∆(Xi), such that the support of ¼i(!) is included in
Xi(!) for all ! 2 Ω.
The conditions ci(!) 2 Xi(!) and supp(¼i(!)) µ Xi(!) mean that in any state ! 2 Ω,
player i can only reveal directly an event he knows and which he can certify at !. Given a
certiﬁability level X, the set of pure communication strategies proﬁles is denoted by C(X) = Q
i2N Ci(Xi), where Ci(Xi) is the set of pure communication strategies of player i. To simplify
the notations we will simply denote by Ci the set of communication strategies and by C = Q
i2N Ci the set of communication strategy proﬁles. Similarly, let Πi be the set of mixed
communication strategies of player i and let Π =
Q
i2N Πi be the set of mixed communication
strategy proﬁles.
2.3 Continuation Bayesian Games
The communication game in which the initial Bayesian game G ´ hN;Ω;p;h;A;(ui)i2Ni is
preceded by the ﬁrst communication stage described in the previous subsection is denoted by
(G;X), where X : Ω ! (2Xi)i2N is the certiﬁability level. For each state of the world ! 2 Ω,
X(!) = (X1(!);:::;Xn(!)) speciﬁes the set of events certiﬁable by each player at !. In the
communication game (G;X), there are two types of behavioral strategies. Communication
strategies deﬁned before specify which messages players will send at each of their initial infor-
mation set. Eﬀective (payoﬀ-relevant) strategies specify the actions chosen in the second stage
continuation Bayesian games, after a vector of messages x = (x1;:::;xn) 2 X = (X1;:::;Xn)
has been sent. Formally:
Deﬁnition 2 A pure eﬀective or payoﬀ-relevant strategy for player i is a function si : X£Ω !
Ai such that si(x;¢) is Hi measurable for all x. A mixed eﬀective or payoﬀ-relevant strategy
for player i is a function ¾i : X £ Ω ! ∆(Ai) such that ¾i(x;¢) is Hi measurable for all x.
Hence, ¾i(ai j x;!) is the probability that player i chooses action ai 2 Ai at ! 2 Ω,
when the vector of events x = (x1;:::;xn) 2 X(!) has been revealed during the commu-
nication stage. We denote by Σ =
Q
i2N Σi the set of mixed eﬀective strategy proﬁles.
9Similarly, the set of pure eﬀective strategy proﬁles is denoted by S =
Q
i2N Si.19 Util-
ity functions are also extended (with some abuse of notations) to eﬀective strategies by
ui(¾;x;!) =
P
a2A ¾(a j x;!)ui(a;!). To characterize second stage expected utilities, and
then rational eﬀective strategies, we have to specify the second stage information structure,
i.e., the information structure of the continuation Bayesian games generated by every possible
vector of events x 2 X revealed in the communication stage. As already mentioned, infor-
mation structures of continuation Bayesian games may be non-partitional and incorrect if a
deviation from an expected communication strategy proﬁle c 2 C occurs in the communica-
tion stage. The intuition is that players perfectly know, at equilibrium, the communication
behaviors of the others, but they cannot always make correct and rational inferences about
the real states of the world when a deviation occurs. Thus, they may not be able to construct
a “true” partition from the messages of a deviant player (from outside equilibrium messages).
Moreover, agents’ information outside the equilibrium path may be incorrect if they make bad
interpretations from a partially revealing message, or if an agent sends a message used in the
equilibrium path, but in a state of the world where he was not expected to use it.
Before presenting second stage information structures formally, let us illustrate the in-
tuition of our previous claims concerning outside equilibrium information. Consider two in-
dividuals, Alice and Bob, with the partitions HA = ff!1g;f!2gg and HB = ff!1;!2gg of
Ω = f!1;!2g. First, assume that at every state ! 2 Ω Alice certiﬁes that the event f!g
has occurred. Consequently, Bob learns the real state and his partition becomes the same as
Alice’s one inasmuch as only truthful messages can be sent (i.e., information is certiﬁed). If
Alice deviates in one state (for example, at !1) by revealing the event f!1;!2g instead of f!1g,
then Bob can reasonably infer that either f!1;!2g, or f!1g, or f!2g are realized events. With
the ﬁrst inference his interpretation is partial; with the second it is complete and correct; with
the last it is incorrect.
Now, assume that Alice certiﬁes the event f!1g at !1 and the event f!1;!2g at !2. If
this behavior is believed by Bob, he will infer the event f!1g at !1 and f!2g at !2 because
the message f!1;!2g is only sent at !2. Here, the formal argument is not only linked to
certiﬁability but also to Bayesian updating along the equilibrium path.20 In this case, Bob’s
partition also becomes the same as Alice’s one. However, if Alice deviates by sending f!1;!2g
at !1, and this is not anticipated by Bob (as it will be the case outside the equilibrium path),
he will infer the event f!2g at !1. In other words, he will consider the state !2 as the only
possible state at !1.
It is clear from this example that Bob’s information can be non-partitional, and even
incorrect, without considering bounded cognitive rationality.21 However, we will see that,
along the equilibrium path, the information structure remains partitional and correct, by
construction. More details on the characteristics of endogenous information structures will be
exposed in Section 3.
To represent players’ knowledge after the communication stage, with possible errors in
information processing, we will use possibility or accessibility correspondences (instead of in-
formation functions), which do not necessarily provide truthful and partitional information
to players. Such possibility correspondences are presented in the next section. Alternatively,
the two-stage game being completely characterized, the sequential equilibrium of the com-
munication game (G;X) can be deﬁned. Such an equilibrium is characterized in details in
19It is important to diﬀerentiate strategy proﬁles in Φ(h) (i.e., strategy proﬁles of the Bayesian game G(h)
without pre-play communication) from strategy proﬁles in Σ or S which depend on the messages sent during
the communication stage.
20In the literature on strategic information revelation this argument is known as the “unravelling argument”.
21Non-partitional information structures are analyzed in details in, e.g., Geanakoplos (1989), Dekel, Lipman,
and Rustichini (1998), and Modica and Rustichini (1999).
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3 Knowledge Equilibrium
In this section we deﬁne an alternative equilibrium to the sequential equilibrium which is
substantially more tractable, explicit, and selective. More precisely, we deﬁne an equilib-
rium concept, called knowledge equilibrium, for the two-stage game (G;X) in which outside
equilibrium beliefs are deduced from consistent possibility correspondences (i.e., consistent
updated and revised knowledge). In Subsection 3.1, we begin to characterize the information
structure conditionally to the messages sent in the communication stage. Some illustrations of
second stage information structures are presented in Subsection 3.2. Then, in Subsection 3.3,
we determine traditional knowledge axioms satisﬁed by these information structures in diﬀer-
ent possible conﬁgurations. Finally, in Subsection 3.4, we deﬁne the knowledge equilibrium
according to our knowledge consistency condition.
3.1 Revision Rules and Knowledge Consistency
In this subsection we successively present several reasonable conditions on players’ inferences
from the ﬁrst stage of public communication. We also give some deﬁnitions and properties
concerning these inferences. Then, we link them to a general knowledge consistency condition
used to deﬁne the knowledge equilibrium.
3.1.1 Equilibrium Inferences
After the communication stage, if players communicate according to the strategy proﬁle c 2 C,
the vector of messages c(!) 2 X(!) is publicly observed at !, and so it becomes common
knowledge. In addition, if players are suﬃciently introspective, messages which are publicly
announced should often convey information beyond what they certify. That is, a reported
event E—which has the pure informational content “the real state of the world belongs to
E” by Proposition 2—can still provide signiﬁcant evidence about an event F ( E. Such
an additional information relies on the fact that players are aware of others’ incentive to
manipulate information. For example, if a particular message is only sent in certain states of
the world, then its meaning is that one of these states must be realized. Hence, the fact that
the message is sent can itself signal some of the sender’s information.
Rational inferences are obtained with the “minimal” requirement that players use Bayes’
rule along the equilibrium path. With such a requirement, inferences do not come purely from
the content of a sentence in isolation from its context. Since our framework is mainly set-
theoretical, we write this requirement by deﬁning states of the world excluded by players when
they receive a vector of messages. Formally, given an initial information structure h = (hi)i2N
on Ω and a proﬁle of communication strategies c 2 C which is used and rationally anticipated,
players’ information functions hc
i : Ω ! 2Ωnf;g after the communication stage are deﬁned by
the following equilibrium inference:
hc
i(!) ´ hi(!) \ c¡1(c(!)) 8 i 2 N; ! 2 Ω; (3)
where c¡1(c(!)) ´ f!0 2 Ω : c(!0) = c(!)g. The intuition behind this simple epistemic
learning process is that if a player sends diﬀerent messages at diﬀerent information sets,
then the others will diﬀerentiate these information sets. It corresponds to a kind of rational
expectation learning. In a state !, players do not only learn the informational content of
communicated messages c(!) = (c1(!);:::;cn(!)), but they also take into account what would
have been revealed in other states than !. Therefore, along the equilibrium path, revealing c(!)
11is equivalent to revealing c¡1 (c(!)). Of course, the event c¡1 (c(!)) conveys at least as much
information as the vector of events c(!) since the assumptions that the initial information is
correct and that revealed information is certiﬁed imply that ! 2 hi(!) µ ci(!) for all ! 2 Ω
and i 2 N, and thus c¡1
i (ci(!)) = f!0 2 Ω : ci(!0) = ci(!)g µ f!0 2 Ω : hi(!0) µ ci(!)g µ
ci(!).
The partition of player i generated by hc
i is denoted by Hc
i and is called the equilibrium
partition of player i given c. Of course, Hc
i is at least as ﬁne as player i’s initial partition Hi.
The information structure given c is denoted by hc ´ (hc
i)i2N (or, equivalently, Hc ´ (Hc
i)i2N).
This information structure can also be constructed in the following way. Let W(ci) be the
partition generated by the function ci, and denote by W(c) =
W
i2N W(ci) the partition
generated by c. That is, the element of W(c) containing ! is c¡1 (c(!)). The partition W(c)
summarizes the information publicly and strategically revealed along the equilibrium path
(i.e., when the proﬁle of communication strategies c was used and anticipated). Given an
equilibrium communication proﬁle c, players partitions after the communication stage can be
rewritten Hc
i = Hi _ W(c) for all i 2 N.
Therefore, by construction, the information structure will be partitional along the equilib-
rium path. This clearly shows that players are able to learn, even if nothing is revealed in the
current state of the world. A player might infer others’ information from their silence because
he is aware of their strategic incentives in disclosing or not information in a self-interested
manner.
Remark 3 The same learning process was introduced by Parikh and Krasucki (1990), and
was used extensively in the common knowledge literature. In particular, the partition W(c)
is called the working partition. In our setting, this working partition is endogenous because
we consider voluntary communication. That is, the functions ci, i 2 N, are determined
by strategic behaviors, whereas they are speciﬁed, in the previous literature, by exogenous
functions (e.g., by posterior probabilities, or by union consistent, convex or injective functions)
which are the same for all agents.
Given a communication strategy proﬁle c 2 C, we have seen that the information structure
becomes hc after the communication stage if c is actually used by all players. Hence, after
the communication stage, the Bayesian game G(hc) will be played. If players do not always
send the message Ω at each of their information sets, then the Bayesian game G(hc) is clearly
diﬀerent from the initial Bayesian game G(h) and, in general, other actions will be played since
the set of Bayesian equilibria Φ¤(h) of G(h) usually diﬀers from the set of Bayesian equilibria
Φ¤(hc) of G(hc). To determine rational communication strategies, the comparison of players’
payoﬀs associated with these equilibria is however not suﬃcient because we must characterize
players’ behavior outside the equilibrium path.22 To do this, we have to characterize players’
second stage information when a deviation from the communication strategy proﬁle c occurs.
Considering such deviations is necessary to support an equilibrium. Hence, we are led to
consider what players would do in any counterfactual event that somebody deviates from its
equilibrium communication strategy.
3.1.2 Necessary Conditions on Outside Equilibrium Inferences
The above-mentioned learning process (3) will apply at equilibrium, when the proﬁle of com-
munication strategies c is chosen and anticipated by every player. However, these inferences,
which go beyond the pure informational content of sent messages, are fragile when deviations
22Comparative static results are suﬃcient to examine ex ante incentives to share information, when players
can commit to reveal their information before they receive it as it is the case in the literature on information
exchange in oligopoly.
12can occur. We will explicitly derive outside equilibrium inferences from outside equilibrium
possibility correspondences (instead of beliefs directly). This permits a deeper study of the
endogenous structure of knowledge. Moreover, cognitive requirements can be described with-
out reference to the sequences of trembles used to deﬁne the sequential equilibrium. As will
be proved, our conditions imply Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) conditions, and in some cases they
are equivalent to theirs.
More precisely, given the sequencing of the complete game (G;X), if a player deviates
from c(!) at !, then each player i’s information in the second stage game is determined
by his initial information hi(!) and by the vector of messages x = (xi)i2N 2 X(!) sent
at ! during the communication stage. Player i’s possibility correspondence is a function
Pi : X £ Ω ! 2Ωnf;g. For each ! 2 Ω and x 2 X(!), Pi(x;!) is called the possibility set
of player i, and is interpreted to mean the collection of states player i thinks are possible
at ! when the vector of messages x 2 X has been sent in the communication stage. The
second stage information structure is then denoted by P = (Pi)i2N. The characterization of
such information is necessary to analyze what players will know (and thus, will do) after the
communication stage (along and outside the equilibrium path), and thus to test the stability
of a given communication behavior. The bulk of the work involved in deﬁning completely
our equilibrium concept consists in characterizing “acceptable”, or consistent, possibility sets
Pi(x;!). In this paragraph we provide several conditions that such possibility sets have to
satisfy. In the next paragraph we give a general condition which ensures all conditions reported
here.
A ﬁrst obvious requirement is that each player i 2 N excludes the states of the world
he considered as impossible at the beginning of the game (perfect recall) and the states of
the world which are proved to be unrealized. In particular, if a player k 2 N reveals xk,
then others exclude the realization of the states ! = 2 xk. Such a condition is a structural
condition.23
RR1 (Certiﬁability Constraint).




From the preceding discussion, the rational expectation learning rule (3) will apply along
the equilibrium path, i.e., when no deviation is observed. An observable deviation from c can
be deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3 A vector of messages x 2 X(!) is an observable deviation from c 2 C by player i
at ! if for all !0 2 hi(!) we have c(!0) 6= x or, equivalently, if hi(!) \ c¡1(x) = ;.
Said diﬀerently, a deviation is observable by player i if the vector of messages he receives
is not compatible with an equilibrium vector of messages in any state player i considers as
possible. A non-observable deviation gives rise to the following revision rule condition:
RR2 (Bayesian Updating). If x 2 X(!) is not an observable deviation from c by player i
at ! (i.e., there exists !0 2 hi(!) such that c(!0) = x), then
Pi(x;!) = hi(!) \ c¡1(x):
This condition is a “standard” condition of Bayesian updating along the equilibrium path
which implies that (but is not equivalent to) Pi(x;!) = hc
i(!) if x = c(!). In particular, if
this condition is always satisﬁed, then fPi(c(!);!) : ! 2 Ωg = Hc
i.
23For the moment, conditions we impose on possibility sets refer to a speciﬁed player i 2 N, a speciﬁed state
of the world ! 2 Ω, and a speciﬁed vector of messages x 2 X(!).
13Remark 4 It is worth noticing that a deviation x can be observable at ! even if x is in the
range of c. This feature contrasts with previous work on strategic information revelation in
which either decision makers are uninformed or players’ signals are independent. In these
cases, a deviation is observable if and only if it does not belong to the range of c. In our
framework, this condition is suﬃcient but not necessary for a deviation to be observable.
As a third condition we reasonably need that each player i makes the same inferences
when he receives the same messages in two states belonging to his same initial information
set. That is, Pi(x;¢) : Ω ! 2Ωnf;g is measurable with respect to Hi for all x.
RR3 (Admissible Revision). If !0 2 hi(!), then
Pi(x;!) = Pi(x;!0):
As a fourth condition we reasonably need that players should not signal information that
they do not possess. In other words, every player i’s interpretation from others’ messages
should be compatible with others’ information, i.e., player i’s inference from each player k
must be a union of some of player k’s information sets.24
RR4 (Admissible Interpretation). There exists y = (y1;:::;yn) 2
Q
k2N Yk such that




The ﬁfth condition we will impose on revised knowledge is not always required by Kreps and
Wilson’s (1982) consistency condition (this claim is proved in Examples 6 and 7 in Section 4).
Our additional condition stipulates that players, when updating their knowledge, are aware
that only unilateral deviations from c are possible. In the terminology of Kreps and Wilson
this is equivalent to the fact that unilateral deviations are inﬁnitely more likely than any
multilateral deviations. Therefore, we will formulate the last revision rule, as well as the
characterization of consistent information structures, only for unilateral deviations. We denote
by X(c;!) the set of unilateral deviations from c at !. That is, X(c;!) ´ fx 2 X(!) : 9 i 2
N; x = (xi;c¡i(!))g. Note that c(!) 2 X(c;!), i.e., c(!) is also a unilateral deviation from c
at !, with some abuse of language.
A consequence of the restriction to unilateral deviations is that if a deviation from c is
observable and identiﬁable by a player, then he will only interpret the outside equilibrium
vector of messages as a deviation by the identiﬁable player. That is, he will continue to apply
Bayes’s rule on others’ communication strategies. More precisely, we will say that a deviation
x 2 X(c;!) from c is j-identiﬁable by player i at ! 2 Ω if player j’s message is the only one
which is incompatible with others’ messages. Formally:
Deﬁnition 4 A deviation x 2 X(c;!) from c is j-identiﬁable by player i at ! 2 Ω if there is
one and only one player j 2 N such that hi(!) \ c¡1
¡j(x¡j) \ xj 6= ;. A deviation x 2 X(c;!)
from c is identiﬁable by player i at ! 2 Ω if there exists j 2 N such that x is j-identiﬁable by
player i at ! 2 Ω.
A deviation which is identiﬁable by player i at ! is also observable by player i at !.
Indeed, if the deviation x is identiﬁable by player i at !, then there is some j 2 N such that
hi(!) \ c¡1
¡l (x¡l) \ xl = ; for all l 6= j, and thus hi(!) \ c¡1(x) = ;. What is more, it is easy
to see that if xj does not belong to the range cj, then the deviation (xj;c¡j(!)) is observable
and j-identiﬁable by any player i 2 N at !. Notice also that if xi 6= ci(!), then (xi;c¡i(!)) is
24This condition reﬂects the fact that, if “trembles” are considered as in Selten (1975) or Kreps and Wilson
(1982), players’ probability of trembling is measurable with respect to their own information.
14always observable and i-identiﬁable by player i 2 N at !. This simply means that player i can
always observe and identify his own deviations. Finally, as shown in Lemma 2 in Appendix B,
when a unilateral deviation x is j-identiﬁable at ! by some player, then player j is eﬀectively
the deviant player at !, i.e., xj 6= cj(!). This might not be true for multilateral deviations.
Of course, an observable deviation is not always identiﬁable. In this case, several players
might be the deviants. Figure 1 presents a very simple example of a deviation which is
observable but not identiﬁable by a third player with no information (i.e., H3 = ff!1;!2gg).
H1 = ff!1g;f!2gg H2 = ff!1g;f!2gg
Equilibrium revelations:
Observed revelations:
ª R ª R
f!1g f!1;!2g f!1;!2g f!2g
f!1;!2g f!1;!2g
Figure 1: An Observable and Non-Identiﬁable Deviation.
We denote by Ni(c;x;!) the set of (unilateral) potential deviants from the communication
strategy proﬁle c at ! to x 2 X(c;!) for player i. Formally, this set is deﬁned by
Ni(c;x;!) ´ fj 2 N : hi(!) \ c¡1
¡j(x¡j) \ xj 6= ;g:
For example, in the deviation considered in Figure 1, N3(c;x;!) = N3(c;(Ω;Ω);!) = f1;2g
for all ! 2 Ω = f!1;!2g. Notice that as long as x 2 X(c;!), i.e., x is a unilateral deviation
from c at !, it is easy to see that Ni(c;x;!) 6= ;.25 Moreover, from the deﬁnition of an
identiﬁable deviation, it is clear that if x is a j-identiﬁable deviation by player i at ! 2 Ω,
then Ni(c;x;!) = fjg.
Our condition RR5 can now be formulated in the following way. This condition is illus-
trated in details in Example 3 in Subsection 3.2.
RR5 (Unilateral Deviations). If x 2 X(c;!) is observable by player i 2 N at !, then
there exists j 2 Ni(c;x;!) and yj 2 Yj such that
Pi(x;!) = hi(!) \ c¡1
¡j(x¡j) \ xj \ yj:
Of course, the revision rule RR5 implies the following revision rule:
RR5’ (Deviant Identiﬁcation). If x 2 X(c;!) is j-identiﬁable by player i 2 N at !, then
there exists yj 2 Yj such that
Pi(x;!) = hi(!) \ c¡1
¡j(x¡j) \ xj \ yj:
The following proposition gives some relations between our diﬀerent revision rules.
Proposition 3 If x 2 X(c;!) is not an observable deviation from c by player i 2 N at ! 2 Ω,
then condition RR2 implies conditions RR1, RR3 and RR4 at i, !, x. If x 2 X(c;!) is an
observable deviation from c by player i 2 N at ! 2 Ω, then condition RR5 implies conditions
RR1 and RR4 at i, !, x.
25If one wants to consider multilateral deviations, then one can deﬁne Ni(c;x;!) as the set of subsets of
potential deviants. In this way, the condition Ni(c;x;!) 6= ; is restored for any deviation x 2 X (unilateral
and multilateral).
15Proof. Let i 2 N, ! 2 Ω, and x 2 X(c;!). Assume that x is not an observable
deviation by player i at ! and that RR2 is satisﬁed, i.e., Pi(x;!) = hi(!) \ c¡1(x). Since
c¡1
k (xk) µ xk, RR1 is immediately satisﬁed. Moreover, we have c¡1
k (xk) 2 Yk because ck is
measurable with respect to Hk. Thus, RR4 is also satisﬁed. Finally, notice that if !0 2 hi(!),
then hi(!) = hi(!0), and thus hi(!) \ c¡1(x) = hi(!0) \ c¡1(x). Consequently, RR2 gives
Pi(x;!) = Pi(x;!0), i.e., RR3 is satisﬁed. When x is an observable deviation by player i at !,
then condition RR5 implies conditions RR1 and RR4 because c¡1
k (xk) µ xk and c¡1
k (xk) 2 Yk.
This completes the proof. ¤
It is convenient to maintain all revision rules separately because some of them are some-
times suﬃcient to characterize a unique possibility correspondence for each player. In this case,
these possibility correspondences will satisfy all of our conditions, as well as our knowledge
consistency condition. This general consistency condition is presented in the next paragraph.
3.1.3 Consistent Second Stage Information Structures
Conditions RR1–RR5 induce stronger requirements on beliefs than those of the weakest version
of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium which is used in most economic applications of dynamic
games of incomplete information. Indeed, this weakest version of the perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium places no restrictions at all on the beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path (along the equilibrium
path, Bayes’ rule is applied).26 To see that stronger requirements on beliefs are imposed here,
note that when player i observes the vector of messages x 2 X(!) from all players at !, his sec-
ond stage (revised) belief at ! about the state !0 is given by p(!0 j Pi(x;!)) (see Appendix C
for more details). That is, second stage beliefs are obtained by conditioning prior beliefs on
possibility correspondences. Before the communication stage, player i’s belief about an event
E at ! is given by the posterior probability p(E j hi(!)) whereas, after the communication
stage, his belief is given by p(E j Pi(x;!)) when the vector of messages x 2 X(!) has been










if !0 2 hi(!) \ c¡1(c(!))
0 otherwise.
Nevertheless, conditions RR1–RR5 are still not suﬃciently restrictive, in general, to ensure
that associated beliefs are consistent in the sense of Kreps and Wilson. Indeed, in Kreps and
Wilson’s sequential equilibrium, there is an agreement on the ranking of the relative probability
of each player’s zero probability information sets, this agreement being generated by arbitrary
small perturbations of the game, with the implicit assumption that the equilibrium history
of the play is common knowledge. In a terminology closer to our setting this means that,
after the communication stage and for every player j 2 N, there is a commonly agreed set of
player j’s information sets that are compatible with an unexpected and identiﬁable deviation
by player j. When the deviation is observable and can be assigned to various players (or set
of players), then Kreps and Wilson’s belief consistency condition implies that there is even a
commonly agreed set of players’ information sets that are compatible with the deviation.
The requirements described just above are very critical ones. Indeed, it is not always rea-
sonable to assume a collective agreement when, even individually and independently, players
cannot always make perfectly rational inferences (remember that possibility correspondences
might entail players knowing false events; see Subsection 3.2 for some illustrations). Nonethe-
less, we still keep this restriction because it is largely accepted in applied game theory and
26See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for more details.
16in the reﬁnement literature.27 In consequence, our work can also be viewed as providing
some explanations and illustrations of what the sequential equilibrium restrictions entail when
strategic communication is possible. It also permits us to analyze what kind of information
structures can endogenously emerge. In particular, it gives some light on the question of what
types of non-partitional information structures are likely to arise (see Subsection 3.3 for more
details).28
In an attempt to get the requirement on outside equilibrium information structures dis-
cussed before, we should impose an additional revision rule condition in order to get Kreps
and Wilson’s (1982) consistency condition. However, given the complexity of the interaction
between several players’ partitions and messages, we do not succeed in this task. Instead,
we construct a relatively simple and cognitively explicit method for characterizing outside
equilibrium information structures. This construction ensures conditions RR1–RR5, as well
as the conditions of the sequential equilibrium, whatever the initial Bayesian game G and the
certiﬁability level X. As mentioned before, our consistency condition is even stronger than
Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) condition. In particular, we assume that deviations are always
interpreted as unilateral deviations. This is done for the sake of tractability more than for a
hope of reﬁnement or selection. Section 4 compares the two approaches.
For every player j 2 N, given a commonly expected communication proﬁle c 2 C, let
ºj be a complete, reﬂexive, and transitive ordering over the set Hj of player j’s information
sets. Hence, the pair (Hj;ºj) is a partially ordered set. The relation hj(!) »j hj(!0) means
that player j is equally likely to deviate (from his communication strategy cj) at his infor-
mation sets hj(!) and hj(!0). When hj(!) Âj hj(!0), player j is inﬁnitely more likely to
deviate at hj(!) than at hj(!0). Therefore, (Hj;ºj) represents the common interpretations
of player j’s deviation.29 Players’ inferences are obtained from this ordering in the following
manner. Denote by Ij the partition of Ω generated by the equivalence relation »j over Hj.
Let I
j
i : C £ X £ Ω ! Ij be the interpretation function of player i from j’s deviation. For
each communication strategy proﬁle c 2 C, each state ! 2 Ω, and each vector of messages
x 2 X(c;!), the set I
j
i (c;x;!) gives the states player i considers as possible when interpret-
ing j’s deviation if the vector of messages x has been revealed but does not conform with the
communication strategy proﬁle c. More precisely, it is the set of possible states of the world
for player i when he excludes the states in which player j is “inﬁnitely less likely” to deviate.
For all j 2 N and E µ Ω, deﬁne
MaxifE j Hj;ºjg ´
©
! 2 E : hj(!) ºj hj(!0); 8 !0 2 E
ª
:
That is, MaxifE j Hj;ºjg is the ºj-maximum component (set of states of the world) of




i (c;x;!) ´ Maxifhi(!) \ c¡1
¡j(x¡j) \ xj j Hj;ºjg: (4)
Of course, this interpretation will apply only if player i thinks that the deviant is player j.
27Our equilibrium concept can however be redeﬁned by imposing only conditions RR1–RR5 (or even weaker
conditions) on second stage information structures without diﬃculties.
28Shin (1994b) also proposes an explanation for non-partitional information structures in a context of strategic
communication. However, in his example, information structures are non-partitional because he does not
consider an information structure on the whole state space, but only on the payoﬀ-relevant (fundamental) state
space. Here, information might be non-partitional on the whole space of exogenous states of the world.
29It is worth noticing that the ordering on player j’s information sets does not depend on the type of deviation.
One can extend our framework by conditioning every ºj on player j’s message xj 2 Xj, but it is unnecessary
for most applications. Our results do not depend on this restriction. The fact that a sequential equilibrium is
not necessarily a knowledge equilibrium in Example 5 in the next section does not rely on this restriction.
17This is for example the case when the deviation is j-identiﬁable by player i. When Ni(c;x;!)
is not a singleton, we will select a particular player in the set of potential deviants. This
selection process will be the same for all players. This does not imply that all players agree
on the same deviant, since some players can identify a deviant, without the others being able
to identify him (this claim is illustrated in the next subsection, in Example 4).
Consider now a bijection ½ : N ! N. This bijection generates a permutation of the set of
players N and induces a strict ordering on N, interpreted in the following way: if ½(i) > ½(j),
then player i is inﬁnitely more likely to deviate than player j.30 Hence, the player which is the
most likely to deviate at ! for player i when the vector of messages x 2 X has been revealed
and corresponds to an observable deviation for player i is
Ni(c;x;! j ½) 2 arg max
k2Ni(c;x;!)
½(k):
Of course, argmaxk2Ni(c;x;!) ½(k) is always a singleton, and if x is j-identiﬁable by player i,
then Ni(c;x;! j ½) = j, whatever the permutation ½. We can now deﬁne the knowledge
consistency condition. This condition is only deﬁned for unilateral deviations. As mentioned
before, since our equilibrium concept only allows unilateral deviations, it is without loss of
generality to restrict our conditions on information structures which can be generated by
unilateral deviations.31
Deﬁnition 5 (Knowledge Consistency) Consider a certiﬁability level X and a communi-
cation strategy proﬁle c. A second stage information structure P = (Pi)i2N is consistent with
(c;X) if there exists a system of complete, reﬂexive, and transitive orderings (Hk;ºk)k2N,
and a bijection ½ : N ! N such that for all ! 2 Ω, i 2 N, and x 2 X(c;!) we have
Pi(x;!) =
(





Remark 5 Given that outside equilibrium information is explicitly characterized, it should
be possible to strengthen our consistency condition by introducing criteria that exclude un-
reasonable states of the world given the message of each player and the payoﬀs’ structure of
the initial Bayesian game G. Such additional restrictions can be done by conditioning the
orderings (ºk)k2N and the bijection ½ to the particular type of game considered.
As shown in the following proposition, a consistent information structure always satisﬁes
revision rules RR1–RR5.
Proposition 4 If the second stage information structure P = (Pi)i2N is consistent with
(c;X), then conditions RR1–RR5 are satisﬁed for all i 2 N, ! 2 Ω, and x 2 X(c;!).
Proof. On the one hand, if x is not an observable deviation for player i at !, then
knowledge consistency is equivalent to RR2. Hence, conditions RR1, RR3, and RR4 are
also satisﬁed by Proposition 3. (Condition RR5 is irrelevant for non-observable deviations.)
On the other hand, if x is an observable deviation for player i at !, then, from the deﬁni-
tion of I
j
i (c;x;!) given by Equation (4) we have, by construction, I
j
i (c;x;!) = I
j
i (c;x;!0)
if hi(!) = hi(!0). Thus, Pi(x;!) = Pi(x;!0), i.e., admissible learning (condition RR3) is
30As for the ordering on information sets, this ordering could be generalized by conditioning it on the
deviation x 2 X.
31The same is true for the sequential equilibrium. That is, to characterize a sequential equilibrium, the
characterization of players’ outside equilibrium beliefs at information sets which cannot be reached by unilateral
deviations is irrelevant.
18satisﬁed. Moreover, from the deﬁnition of the application Maxi, there exists yj 2 Yj such
that I
j
i (c;x;!) = hi(!) \ c¡1
¡j(x¡j) \ xj \ yj, which shows that condition RR5 is satisﬁed.
Finally, since RR5 is satisﬁed, Proposition 3 gives RR1 and RR4 (condition RR2 is irrelevant
for observable deviations). ¤
In the next subsection we illustrate revision rules RR1–RR5 and the knowledge consistency
condition. We also show that the revisions rules are not always suﬃcient to ensure the
knowledge consistency condition.
3.2 Illustrations
Let C(c) ´ f˜ c 2 C : 8 ! 2 Ω; 9 i 2 N; ˜ c¡i(!) = c¡i(!)g be the set of unilateral deviations
from the communication strategy proﬁle c 2 C. That is, if ˜ c 2 C(c), then ˜ c(!) 2 X(c;!). To
scrutinize second stage information structures when a communication strategy proﬁle ˜ c 2 C(c)
is used, we deﬁne P˜ c
i (!) ´ Pi(˜ c(!);!) for all ! 2 Ω. That is, P˜ c
i (!) is the set of states player i
conceives as possible in the second stage game at !, when the proﬁle of communication
strategies ˜ c has been used in the ﬁrst stage game. With some abuse of language, we also call
the function P˜ c
i : Ω ! 2Ωnf;g player i’s possibility correspondence. Note that, by deﬁnition,
if P is consistent with (c;X), then Pc
i (!) = hc
i(!) for all ! 2 Ω. We call the possibility
correspondence P˜ c
i consistent with (c;X) if it can be obtained from a consistent second stage
information structure P = (Pi)i2N.
Condition RR2 (Bayesian updating) implies that if a player j deviates at one of his in-
formation set by sending a message he should have sent in an other state (according to his
communication strategy cj), other players can make errors in information updating, i.e., we
can have non-partitional and erroneous information structures. To see this, simply assume
(as in the example with Alice and Bob on page 10) that H1 = ff!1g;f!2gg, H2 = ff!1;!2gg,
c1(!1) = f!1g, and c1(!2) = Ω. We get Hc
2 = fhc
2(!1);hc
2(!2)g = ff!1g;f!2gg. By con-
struction, this information structure is partitional. Consider an other communication strat-
egy proﬁle ˜ c 2 C(c) satisfying ˜ c1(!1) = ˜ c1(!2) = Ω. That is, player 1 deviates at !1 by
revealing Ω instead of c1(!1) = f!1g. In that case, if c remains the expected communica-
tion proﬁle, the consistent possibility correspondence of player 2 veriﬁes P˜ c
2(!1) = P˜ c
2(!2)
(= P2(Ω;!1) = P2(Ω;!2)) = f!2g by RR2. The information structure associated with the
(outside equilibrium) possibility correspondence P˜ c
2, when player 1 reveals Ω at !1 and !2, is
clearly non-partitional and erroneous: P˜ c
2(!1) [ P˜ c
2(!2) 6= Ω, and at !1 player 2 knows f!2g
(because P˜ c
2(!1) = f!2g) which is a wrong knowledge (because !1 = 2 P˜ c
2(!1)).
Another situation in which players can have wrong knowledge occurs when they make
interpretations from observable deviations which are ﬁner than the interpretations restricted
to the pure informational content of a message. For instance, if c1(!) = f!g and ˜ c1(!) = Ω for
all ! 2 Ω in the last example, then we can have P˜ c
2(!1) = P˜ c
2(!2) = f!2g if player 2 infers the
event f!2g when he observes the message Ω from player 1 (this is obtained if f!2g Â1 f!1g).
In this case, the reason for wrong knowledge diﬀers from the last one where the deviation
from c was not observable. As will be shown in Theorem 1, the only case in which we are sure
that an information structure is correct (i.e., satisﬁes the truth axiom of knowledge) is when
no deviation occurs at all (i.e., ˜ c = c) or when the deviation is identiﬁable and when players
do not make interpretations which go beyond the pure informational content of the deviant’s
message (i.e., Ij = fΩg for all j 2 N). From this theorem we also know that a partitional
information structure is only guaranteed when no deviation occurs at all.
The fact that players update their outside equilibrium beliefs by conditioning on non-
partitional and possibly erroneous information structures means that outside equilibrium, a
substantial degree of information processing error might happen. Some players might be
unaware of the subtle informational content of some messages by perceiving only their face
19value, by making false interpretations, or by applying erroneously Bayes’ rule on unobservable
deviations.
In the following example we give a detailed illustration of the knowledge consistency con-
dition and we analyze the properties of the information structure along and outside the equi-
librium path.
Example 2 Let Ω = f!1;!2;!3;!4;!5;!6g, and let
H1 = ff!1;!2g;f!3;!4g;f!5;!6gg;
H2 = ff!1g;f!2;!3;!4;!5g;f!6gg;
be the initial information partitions of players 1 and 2. Consider the following communication
strategies:
c1(!) = f!1;!2g; if ! 2 f!1;!2g;
c1(!) = f!3;!4g; if ! 2 f!3;!4g;
c1(!) = Ω; if ! 2 f!5;!6g;
c2(!) = Ω; for all ! 2 Ω:
Player 1 reveals all his information at !1, !2, !3 and !4, he reveals nothing at !5 and !6, and
player 2 never reveals anything. We obtain Hc




W(c) = fc¡1(c(!)) : ! 2 Ωg = fc¡1
1 (c1(!)) : ! 2 Ωg = ff!1;!2g;f!3;!4g;f!5;!6gg:
Let !3 be the real state of the world and assume that player 1 deviates from his commu-
nication strategy c1 to the communication strategy ˜ c1 characterized by
˜ c1(!) =
(
f!1;!2;!3;!4g if ! 2 f!3;!4g
c1(!) otherwise.
(6)
This deviation is observable and 1-identiﬁable by both players at !3. Player 1’s knowledge
is unchanged but the (outside equilibrium) possibility correspondence of player 2 must verify
P˜ c
2(!3) (= P2(˜ c1(!3);!3)) µ h2(!3) \ ˜ c1(!3) = f!2;!3;!4g by the certiﬁability constraint
(condition RR1). Moreover, we have either P˜ c
2(!3) = f!2g, or P˜ c
2(!3) = f!3;!4g, or P˜ c
2(!3) =
f!2;!3;!4g by admissible interpretation (condition RR4).32
Assume that the prior probabilities are p(!) = 1=6 for all ! 2 Ω. At !3, without player 1’s
deviation, player 2 necessarily believes both states !3 and !4 with probability 1/2 (because
hc
2(!3) = f!3;!4g, and thus p(!3 j f!3;!4g) = p(!4 j f!3;!4g) = 1=2). After the deviation,
player 2 might consider the states !2, !3 and !4 as possible (when P˜ c
2(!3) = f!2;!3;!4g) and
should believe each of those states with probability 1/3 (because p(! j f!2;!3;!4g) = 1=3
for ! 2 f!2;!3;!4g). Then, if the deviation to ˜ c1 occurs, the information of player 2 is
non-partitional: his possibility set at !2 is P˜ c
2(!2) = hc
2(!2) = f!2g by Bayesian updating
(condition RR2) whereas his possibility set at !3 is P˜ c
2(!3) = f!2;!3;!4g. Nevertheless, in
32The ﬁrst inference P
˜ c
2(!3) = f!2g is obtained when f!1;!2g Â1 f!3;!4g; the second inference P
˜ c
2(!3) =
f!3;!4g is obtained when f!1;!2g Á1 f!3;!4g; ﬁnally, the inference P
˜ c
2(!3) = f!2;!3;!4g is obtained when
f!1;!2g »1 f!3;!4g.
20this case, player 2 does not exclude the true state at !3. He does exclude the true state,
however, if P˜ c
2(!3) = f!2g because !3 = 2 P˜ c
2(!3).




f!1g if ! 2 f!1g
c2(!) otherwise.
This deviation is observable and 2-identiﬁable by both players. Moreover, the outside equilib-
rium belief of player 1 is uniquely deﬁned by the certiﬁability constraint, and we necessarily
get P˜ c
1(!1) = f!1g. With such a deviation player 1 necessarily knows the event f!1g at !1
although he did not know it with the initial communication strategies. Notice that the outside
equilibrium information structure is also non-partitional because P˜ c
1(!2) = hc
1(!2) = f!1;!2g.
However, player 1 has never a wrong knowledge, i.e., never knows an unrealized event.
To illustrate that conditions RR1–RR5 may not be suﬃcient for knowledge consistency,
consider a third player with the partition
H3 = ff!1;!2;!3g;f!4g;f!5;!6gg;
and (for simplicity) without communication possibilities (i.e., X3 = fΩg). Assume that
player 1 deviates according to (6). The deviation is also 1-identiﬁable by player 3. We
have seen that there are three consistent revisions for player 2 at !3. These revisions imply
the following conditions on the ordering º1:
(i) P˜ c
2(!3) = f!2g ) f!1;!2g Â1 f!3;!4g;
(ii) P˜ c
2(!3) = f!3;!4g ) f!3;!4g Â1 f!1;!2g;
(iii) P˜ c
2(!3) = f!2;!3;!4g ) f!1;!2g »1 f!3;!4g.
In case (i) we get, from the deﬁnition of the interpretation function (4),
P˜ c




! 2 h3(!3) \ f!1;!2;!3;!4g : h1(!) º1 h1(!0); 8 !0 2 f!1;!2;!3g
ª
= f!1;!2g:
Similarly, in case (ii) we have P˜ c
3(!3) = f!3g, and in case (iii) we have P˜ c
3 = f!1;!2;!3g.
These relations between players’ inferences are clearly not imposed by RR1–RR5, but will be
necessary to get a sequential equilibrium (see Section 4).
The following example illustrates condition RR5 by showing some restrictions it imposes





and consider the following anticipated proﬁle of communication strategies:
21c1(!1) = f!1g
c1(!2) = c1(!3) = c1(!4) = f!2;!3;!4g
c2(!1) = c2(!2) = c2(!3) = f!1;!2;!3g
c2(!4) = f!4g:
Let ˜ c 2 C(c) be the unilateral deviation from c satisfying
˜ c1(!) = Ω for all ! 2 Ω
˜ c2(!) = c2(!) for all ! 2 Ω.
This deviation is always observable and 1-identiﬁable. Assume that the real state is ! 6= !4, i.e,
the vector of observed messages is ˜ c(!) = (Ω;f!1;!2;!3g). It is easy to verify that player 3’s
possibility correspondence characterized by P˜ c
3(!) = f!1;!2g or P˜ c
3(!) = f!3g satisﬁes con-
ditions RR1–RR4, but not condition RR5. The only possibility correspondence satisfying
conditions RR1–RR5 must be characterized by P˜ c
3(!) = f!1g or P˜ c
3(!) = f!1;!2;!3g or
P˜ c
3(!) = f!2;!3g.33
The following example shows that a deviation can be identiﬁed by a player, without being






and consider the following communication strategies of players 1 and 2 (communication of
players 3 and 4 is ignored):
c1(!) =
(




Ω if ! = !1
h2(!) otherwise.
Consider the following deviation from c: ˜ c1(!1) = Ω, ˜ c1(!) = c1(!) for all ! 6= !1, ˜ c2(!4) = Ω,
and ˜ c2(!) = c2(!) for all ! 6= !4. Let ! = !1 be the real state. In this case, the deviation is
not identiﬁable by player 3 since N3(c;˜ c(!1);!1) = f1;2g. On the contrary, it is 1-identiﬁable
by player 4 at !1 since N4(c;˜ c(!1);!1) = f1g. Consider the bijection ½ satisfying ½(i) = i for
all i 2 N. Hence, N3(c;˜ c(!1);!1 j ½) = 2. Consequently, player 3 will interpret the deviation
as a deviation by player 2, whereas player 4 will interpret the deviation as a deviation by
player 1. Whatever the orderings (ºj)j over players’ partitions, we obtain P˜ c
3(!1) = f!4g
and P˜ c
4(!1) = f!1g. It is interesting to note that, in this example, player 4 does not make
errors in information processing, contrary to player 3, the reason being that player 4 can
correctly identify the deviant, whereas player 3 cannot identify it correctly because his initial
information (represented by H3) is not suﬃcient to make such an identiﬁcation.
33It can be shown, in this example, that Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) consistency condition imposes a similar
condition, mainly that beliefs about !2 and !3 are the same for the third player. Example 7 illustrates a similar
conﬁguration in which our condition diﬀers from Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) one.
223.3 Rationality of Consistent Knowledge
Usually, economists assume that agents are rational both in their act and in their representa-
tion. This second assumption requires that agents’ knowledge is derived from consistent and
perfectly rational (but possibly incomplete) inferences. Rational inferences are often associ-
ated with strong requirements on agents’ knowledge. Agents’ knowledge is generally described
by knowledge operators. Remember that a knowledge operator for player i 2 N is a function
K˜ c
i : 2Ω ! 2Ω. Given a second stage information structure P = (Pi)i2N and a proﬁle of
communication strategies ˜ c 2 C, each player i’s knowledge operator is characterized by
K˜ c
iE ´ f! 2 Ω : P˜ c
i (!) µ Eg; 8 E 2 2Ω;
where, as before, P˜ c
i (!) ´ Pi(˜ c(!);!).
In this subsection we analyze the properties of second stage information structures on Ω
by investigating if they satisfy the ﬁve axioms assumed in the standard model of knowledge.
As was already mentioned and illustrated, it turns out that few of these axioms are satisﬁed in
the continuation Bayesian games, except in the continuation Bayesian game of the equilibrium
path. These axioms are given below.
(A0) K˜ c
iΩ = Ω: an agent always knows that the universal event Ω is realized.
(A1) K˜ c
i(E \ F) = K˜ c
iE \ K˜ c
iF (distribution axiom): an agent knows E and F iff he knows
E and he knows F.
(A2) K˜ c
iE µ E (non delusion or truth axiom): all what an agent knows is true.
(A3) K˜ c
iE µ K˜ c
iK˜ c
iE (positive introspection axiom): if an agent knows E, then he knows
that he knows E.
(A4) K˜ c
iE µ K˜ c
iK˜ c
iE (negative introspection axiom): if an agent does not know E, then he
knows that he does not know it.
The next theorem shows that, outside equilibrium, non delusion and introspection axioms
are not necessarily satisﬁed. Nevertheless, if there are only two states of the world, the positive
introspection axiom is always satisﬁed. Moreover, when the deviation can be identiﬁed and
players restrict their interpretation to the pure informational content of the deviant’s message
(and continue to apply Bayes’ rule on others’ communication strategies), the truth axiom is
satisﬁed. Finally, and not surprisingly, all axioms are satisﬁed along the equilibrium path,
i.e., when no player deviates from his communication strategy. Axioms (A0) and (A1) will
always be satisﬁed by construction of the knowledge operator.
Theorem 1 Let P = (Pi)i2N be a second stage information structure consistent with (c;X),
let ˜ c 2 C(c) be a unilateral deviation from c, and let (K˜ c
i)i2N be the associated knowledge
operators. Then, for all i 2 N:
(i) K˜ c
i satisﬁes (A0) and (A1);
(ii) If ˜ c = c, then K˜ c
i satisﬁes (A0)–(A4);
(iii) If ˜ c 6= c, then K˜ c
i does not necessarily satisfy (A2), (A3) and (A4);
(iv) If jΩj = 2, then K˜ c
i satisﬁes (A3);
(v) If ˜ c(!) is an identiﬁable deviation by player i at ! and Ij = fΩg for all j 2 N, then
! 2 P˜ c
i (!). Hence, if ˜ c(!) is identiﬁable by player i in all states ! 2 Ω and if Ij = fΩg
for all j 2 N, then K˜ c
i satisﬁes (A2).
23Proof.
(i) This property results directly from the deﬁnition of the knowledge operator.
(ii) By construction, fPc
i (!) : ! 2 Ωg = fhc
i(!) : ! 2 Ωg = Hc
i is a partition of Ω and
! 2 Pc
i (!) for all ! 2 Ω. The fact that such a partitional information structure satisﬁes axioms
(A0)–(A4) is a well known result (actually, a partitional and correct information structure is
equivalent to (A0)–(A4); see, for example, Geanakoplos, 1994).
(iii) The fact that the truth axiom is not necessarily satisﬁed when ˜ c 6= c, even when jΩj =
2, was shown with the example of Alice and Bob. Indeed, in this example, if c1(!1) = f!1g,
c1(!2) = Ω, and ˜ c1(!) = Ω for all ! 2 Ω, then P˜ c
2(!1) = f!2g. Hence, K˜ c
2f!2g = f!1g * f!2g.
To see that the negative introspection axiom may not be satisﬁed let c1(!) = f!g for all ! 2 Ω,
˜ c1(!1) = f!1g and ˜ c1(!2) = Ω. Then we can have P˜ c
2(!1) = f!1g and P˜ c
2(!2) = Ω. Hence,
K˜ c
2f!1g = f!2g * K˜ c
2K˜ c
2f!1g = ;. To show that the positive introspection axiom may not be
satisﬁed, consider three states of the world34 Ω = f!1;!2;!3g and let H1 = ff!1g;f!2g;f!3gg,
H2 = fΩg, c1(!) = Ω for all ! 2 Ω, ˜ c1(!1) = f!1;!2g and ˜ c1(!) = Ω = c(!) if ! 6= !1. In
this case, we can have P˜ c
2(!1) = f!1;!2g and P˜ c
2(!) = Ω for ! 6= !1. We get K˜ c
2f!1;!2g =
f!1g * K˜ c
2K˜ c
2f!1;!2g = ;.
(iv) Let Ω = f!1;!2g. Note ﬁrst that for any E µ Ω we either have K˜ c
iE = Ω, or K˜ c
iE = ;,
or K˜ c
iE = f!g for some ! 2 Ω. In the ﬁrst case we necessarily have K˜ c
iK˜ c
iE = Ω and thus
K˜ c
iE µ K˜ c
iK˜ c
iE. In the second case we necessarily have K˜ c
iK˜ c
iE = ;, and thus positive
introspection is also satisﬁed. Thus, assume that K˜ c
iE = f!g for some ! 2 Ω. Hence, either
K˜ c
iE = f!1g or K˜ c
iE = f!2g. Without loss of generality let K˜ c
iE = f!1g. If E = f!1g, then
K˜ c
iK˜ c
iE = f!1g, i.e., K˜ c
iK˜ c
iE µ K˜ c
iE. If E = f!2g then P˜ c
i (!1) = f!2g from the deﬁnition of
the knowledge operator. In this case, positive introspection is not satisﬁed iff
K˜ c
iE * K˜ c
iK˜ c
iE
, f!1g * K˜ c
if!1g
, K˜ c
if!1g = f!2g or K˜ c
if!1g = ;
, P˜ c
i (!2) = f!1g or P˜ c
i (!2) = Ω:
Since player i does not know the true state both at !1 and !2, we necessarily have
T
i2N ˜ ci(!) =
Ω for all ! 2 Ω by the certiﬁability constraint (condition RR1, which is necessarily satisﬁed
from Proposition 4). But then, from admissible revision (condition RR3) we have P˜ c
i (!1) =
P˜ c
i (!2), leading to a contradiction.
(v) Let j be the identiﬁed deviant at !. Then, from the knowledge consistency condition
we get (since an identiﬁable deviation by i is also observable by i):
P˜ c
i (!) = Maxifhi(!) \ c¡1
¡j(˜ c¡j(!)) \ ˜ cj(!) j Hj;ºjg:
Since by assumption Ij = fΩg, this gives
P˜ c
i (!) = hi(!) \ c¡1
¡j(˜ c¡j(!)) \ ˜ cj(!):
Moreover, from Lemma 2 in Appendix B we have ˜ ck(!) = ck(!) for all k 6= j. Thus, ! 2
c¡1
¡j(˜ c¡j(!)). Therefore, since ! 2 hi(!) and ! 2 ˜ cj(!), we obtain ! 2 P˜ c
i (!). If this is true for
all ! 2 Ω, then the condition P˜ c
i (!) µ E implies ! 2 E, i.e., (A2) is satisﬁed. This completes
the proof. ¤
34Three states are necessary to get a failure of the positive introspection axiom given property (iv).
243.4 Equilibrium of the Complete Game
Having deﬁned consistency of second stage information structures, we can now deﬁne a re-
lated equilibrium for the complete game with the communication stage and the second stage
Bayesian games based on information consistent with previous messages.
Given a second stage information structure P = (Pi)i2N and a proﬁle of eﬀective strategies
¾ 2 Σ, player i’s expected utility in the continuation Bayesian game following a vector of























A proﬁle of eﬀective strategies ¾ 2 Σ is at equilibrium in the continuation Bayesian game
generated by the vector of messages x 2 X if we have
Ui(¾;x;Pi;!) ¸ Ui(ai;¾¡i;x;Pi;!); 8 i 2 N; ! 2
\
k2N
xk; ai 2 Ai: (8)
The set of eﬀective strategy proﬁles satisfying Equation (8) is denoted by Σ¤(P;x) µ Σ.
Accordingly, the set of eﬀective strategy proﬁles satisfying Equation (8) for all x 2 X is
denoted by Σ¤(P) =
T
x2X Σ¤(P;x) µ Σ. Hence, an eﬀective strategy proﬁle ¾ 2 Σ¤(P)
satisﬁes sequential rationality at the second stage game when the second stage information
structure is P. That is, the proﬁle of eﬀective strategies always forms some kind of Bayesian
equilibrium of the second stage game given the information structure generated by the proﬁle of
communication strategies (outside and along the equilibrium path). This is the ﬁrst condition
for a knowledge equilibrium. According to the second condition, each player i 2 N has never
any incentive to change his communication strategy given the second stage strategies and
others’ communication behaviors. In a state ! 2 Ω, if player i communicates xi 2 Xi(!)
instead of ci(!) 2 Xi(!), his expected utility at the beginning of the ﬁrst stage game, given
the second stage information structure P and the proﬁle of eﬀective and optimal strategies
¾ 2 Σ¤(P), does not strictly increase. The third condition is the condition of knowledge
consistency (Deﬁnition 5).
Deﬁnition 6 A knowledge equilibrium of the game (G;X) is a proﬁle of eﬀective strategies
¾ 2 Σ, a proﬁle of communication strategies c 2 C, and a second stage information structure
P = (Pi)i2N satisfying the following conditions:
1. Second Stage Rationality: ¾ 2 Σ¤(P);































3. Consistent Knowledge: P is consistent with (c;X).
25Note that if (¾;c;P) is a knowledge equilibrium, then there exists a Bayesian equilibrium
Á 2 Φ¤(hc) of the Bayesian game G(hc) such that ¾(c(!);!) = Á(!) for all ! 2 Ω. That is,
along the equilibrium path, the second stage strategies correspond to a Bayesian equilibrium
of the game G(hc). If c(!) = Ω for all ! 2 Ω and i 2 N, then the information structure is
not modiﬁed (i.e., hc = h) and thus payoﬀ-relevant actions chosen along the equilibrium path
will be the same as those induced by a Bayesian equilibrium of the initial Bayesian game G
without communication.
4 Knowledge and Sequential Equilibria
In this section we analyze some links between knowledge equilibria and sequential equilib-
ria. Theorem 2 shows our main result: a knowledge equilibrium of a Bayesian game G given
a certiﬁability level X is always a Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) sequential equilibrium of the
communication game (G;X). Thus, existence of particular knowledge equilibria (as perfectly
revealing or non-revealing ones) in some classes of games will imply existence of sequential
equilibria with the same properties. Furthermore, we keep all properties of sequential equi-
libria without referring to sequences of perturbed and strictly positive strategy proﬁles. Ad-
ditionally, we show in Proposition 5 that if informative disclosures are restrained to complete
disclosures (i.e., for all ! 2 Ω and i 2 N either ci(!) = Ω or ci(!) = hi(!)), then the set of
non-revealing knowledge equilibria and the set of non-revealing sequential equilibria coincide.
Several examples illustrate the diﬀerence between the two approaches. This diﬀerence stems
from the restrictions imposed by the knowledge equilibrium on outside equilibrium beliefs
which are not required by Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) consistency condition.
Theorem 2 If a proﬁle of communication and eﬀective strategies forms a knowledge equilib-
rium of the communication game (G;X), then it also forms a sequential equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix C. ¤
Remark 6 As already mentioned, if players’ beliefs are compatible with the certiﬁability con-
straint and are obtained by Bayes’ rule whenever possible, then these beliefs are not necessarily
consistent. Hence, they are not suﬃcient to get a sequential or knowledge equilibrium. Such
weak and basic conditions on beliefs are used in almost all existing papers on strategic infor-
mation revelation. They are not suﬃcient here because we consider substantially more general
and complex information structures. In particular, the corresponding Harsanyi’s (1967–1968)
information structure of the initial partitional information structure h = (hi)i2N involves
implicitly correlated types. (See Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991 for more details on the links
between various consistency conditions and Kreps and Wilson’s consistency condition.)
Remark 7 Since a knowledge equilibrium only admits pure communication strategies, such
an equilibrium might not exist (contrary to the sequential equilibrium deﬁned in Appendix A).
However, a knowledge equilibrium with pure communication strategies remains an equilibrium
when players are allowed to use mixed communication strategies. Thus, considering pure com-
munication strategies is w.l.o.g. for the existence of, e.g., perfectly revealing or non-revealing
equilibria. Moreover, we expect that most models and applications considered in the litera-
ture on strategic information revelation apply equivalently by using the knowledge equilibrium,
with certainly substantially more tractability.
The following very simple example shows that a sequential equilibrium—even in pure com-
munication and eﬀective strategies—is not necessarily a knowledge equilibrium. The reason is
26that, contrary to the sequential equilibrium, a knowledge equilibrium can be supported only
by a ﬁnite set of outside equilibrium beliefs, and these beliefs depend on prior probabilities.
This feature may be seen either as an advantage or as a restriction of our consistency condi-
tion. In the sequential equilibrium, prior beliefs only matter along the equilibrium path, but
not at information sets reached with zero probability. In the knowledge equilibrium, prior
beliefs always characterize a player’s second stage belief (after this player has excluded some
states, of course).
Example 5 Let N = f1;2g be a set of players, Ω = f!1;!2g a payoﬀ-relevant state space,
p(!1) = p(!2) = 1=2 a prior probability distribution on Ω, and H1 = ff!1g;f!2gg and
H2 = ff!1;!2gg an initial information structure. Therefore, only player 1 is informed about
the payoﬀ-relevant state and it is common knowledge that he is informed. His communication
strategy is denoted by c : Ω ! X1. Consider the initial Bayesian game of Figure 2 (where
payoﬀ-relevant actions A, B, C, and D are only available to player 2).
!1 A B C D
(0;6) (1;5) (¡2;0) (1;¡6)
!2 A B C D
(1;¡6) (1;1) (¡2;2) (0;3)
Figure 2: Bayesian Game of Example 5.
In the unique Bayesian equilibrium of this game, player 2 plays B, i.e., Á2(B j !) = 1
for all ! 2 Ω. Adding the communication stage, and assuming perfect certiﬁability (i.e.,
X1 = Y1 = ff!1g;f!2g;f!1;!2gg) we can represent the complete game in extensive form as
in Figure 3.

























































Figure 3: Two-Stage Extensive Form Game of Example 5.
We can easily verify that there exists a non-revealing knowledge equilibrium and se-
quential equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium where player 1 reveals c(!) = Ω in any state
27! 2 Ω. In this case, outside equilibrium beliefs and possibility correspondences are unique
(by the certiﬁability constraint) and player 2 plays B if he receives the message x = Ω,
A if he receives the message x = f!1g, and D if he receives the message x = f!2g (i.e.,
¾2(B j Ω;!) = ¾2(A j f!1g;!) = ¾2(D j f!2g;!) = 1 for all ! 2 Ω).
There is also a perfectly revealing sequential equilibrium where player 1 reveals c(!) = f!g
in any state ! 2 Ω. To support this equilibrium player 2 has to play C when he receives an
outside equilibrium message, i.e., when he receives the message x = Ω from player 1. Player 2
plays this action if and only if his belief about !1 when he receives the message Ω belongs to
the interval [1
7; 1
6]. Such an outside equilibrium belief cannot be achieved with our approach in
terms of possibility correspondences. Indeed, we have either P2(Ω;!) = f!g, or P2(Ω;!) = Ω,
or P2(Ω;!) = Ωnf!g. In any case, player 2’s belief about ! is either 1, 1=2 (= p(!)), or 0.
Therefore, he never plays action C, and thus player 1 has always an incentive to deviate
from full revelation in at least one state.35 As mentioned before, this can be seen either as a
weakness or as a advantage of our consistency condition because it restricts signiﬁcantly the set
of outside equilibrium beliefs. Other restrictions not required by the sequential equilibrium,
but required by our knowledge consistency condition are presented in the following examples.
Contrary to the present example, these restrictions are due to the fact that we do not allow
players to interpret an observable deviation as a multilateral deviation. As already mentioned,
multilateral deviations could be allowed in our model without substantial diﬃculties (see
Footnote 25).
Example 6 Let N = f1;2;3;4g, Ω = f!1;!2g, H1 = H2 = H3 = ff!1g;f!2gg, H4 = fΩg,
c1(!1) = c2(!1) = f!1g, c3(!2) = f!2g, c1(!2) = c2(!2) = c3(!1) = Ω, and consider the
deviation to the vector of messages x = (Ω;Ω;Ω) at !2. This deviation is 3-identiﬁable at
!2 by all players, and in particular by player 4. Hence, P4(x;!2) = f!2g, i.e., player 4’s
belief about !1 is p(!1 j P4(x;!2)) = 0. Nevertheless, Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) consistency
condition allows this belief to be equal to one, i.e., ¹4(!1 j x;!) = 1 for all ! 2 Ω. To see
this, consider the “trembling” communication strategies36 (¼t
i)i2N satisfying limt!1 ¼t
i(c(!) j
!) = 1, ¼t
1(Ω j !1) = ¼t
2(Ω j !1) = "t, and ¼t
3(Ω j !2) = ("t)
3, where limt!1 "t = 0. We get,
for all ! 2 Ω,
¹t






































36See Appendix A for more details.
28c1(!) = f!g for all ! 2 Ω, c2(!) =
(
Ω if ! 2 f!1;!2g
f!g if ! = !3,
and consider player 1’s deviation to x1 = Ω. Since Ω does not belong to the range of c1, this
deviation is always 1-identiﬁable. Condition RR5 implies P3((x1;c2(!));!) µ c¡1
2 (c2(!)) =
c¡1
2 (Ω) = f!1;!2g for ! 2 f!1;!2g. Thus, player 3’s belief about !3 is null at !1 and at
!2 since p(!3 j P3((x1;c2(!1));!1)) = p(!3 j P3((x1;c2(!2));!2)) = p(!3 j f!1;!2g) = 0.
However, the belief ¹3(!3 j (x1;c2(!1));!) = ¹3(!3 j (x1;c2(!2));!) = 1 for all ! 2 Ω is
compatible with Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) consistency condition. To see this, consider the
“trembling” communication strategies satisfying ¼t
1(Ω j !3) = ¼t
2(Ω j !3) = "t and ¼t
1(Ω j
!1) = ¼t
1(Ω j !2) = ("t)
3. We get, for all ! 2 Ω,
¹t






2(Ω j !1) + p(!2)¼t
1(Ω j !2)¼t
















In Example 5 on page 27 we have seen that we can have a perfectly revealing sequential
equilibrium without having a perfectly revealing knowledge equilibrium, even with a very sim-
ple information structure. However, in this example, the non-revealing sequential equilibrium
was a knowledge equilibrium. In the next proposition we show, under a particular certiﬁa-
bility level called radical certiﬁability level, that if a sequential equilibrium is non-revealing,
then it is a knowledge equilibrium. In other words, if all knowledge equilibria involve some
knowledge sharing (i.e., are not non-revealing) this is also true for all sequential equilibria.
With a radical certiﬁability level players can only reveal exactly what they know or nothing.
More precisely:
Deﬁnition 7 A certiﬁability level X is a radical certiﬁability level if for all i 2 N and ! 2 Ω
we have either Xi(!) = fΩg or Xi(!) = fΩ;hi(!)g.
In particular, if jΩj = 2 (as in Example 5) the certiﬁability level is necessarily radical.
Proposition 5 Under the radical certiﬁability level, if a sequential equilibrium is non-revealing,
then it is a knowledge equilibrium.
Proof. The only diﬀerences between sequential equilibria of a communication game and
knowledge equilibria are due to the use of pure communication strategies and particular degen-
erate second stage beliefs in the knowledge equilibrium (see Appendices A and C). Of course,
the restriction to pure communication strategies has no impact when considering deviations
from a non-revealing equilibrium, which is in pure strategies. Hence, we have to show that
consistent beliefs (in the sense of Kreps and Wilson, 1982) are the same as beliefs generated
by consistent possibility correspondences when a unilateral deviation occurs. Let c 2 C be
a non-revealing equilibrium, i.e., ci(!) = Ω for all ! 2 Ω and i 2 N. A unilateral deviation
x 2 X(c;!) by any player i 2 N at ! is necessarily identiﬁable by all players since it is char-
acterized by a public disclosure x = (Ω:::;hi(!);:::;Ω). Therefore, from revision rule RR5’
29(deviant identiﬁcation) we have Pj(x;!) = hj(!)\hi(!) for all j 2 N. We have to show that
for any consistent belief ¹ (in the sense of Kreps and Wilson), ¹j(!0 j x;!) = p(!0 j Pj(x;!))
for all !0 2 Ω and j 2 N. Using the fact that cj(!) = Ω for all ! 2 Ω and j 2 N, that
player i’s (trembling) communication strategy is measurable with respect to Hi, and the fact









i(xi j !00) = lim
t!1
¼t
i(xi j !000) = 0 for all !00, !000 2 hi(!),
and ¼t
i(xi j !00) = 0 for all !00 = 2 hi(!).
Finally, the result is obtained by applying Bayes’ rule on these (unspeciﬁed) trembling com-
munication strategies (see Equation (10) on page 34 in Appendix C). ¤
Thus, under the radical certiﬁability level we know by Theorem 2 and the last proposition
that there exists a non-revealing sequential equilibrium if and only if there exists a non-
revealing knowledge equilibrium. This result is of particular interest since the non-existence
of a non-revealing knowledge equilibrium might suggest that Bayesian equilibria of the initial
Bayesian game G = G(h) without communication are not robust against strategic information
revelation.
5 Conclusion and Discussion
It is a commonplace that voluntary and direct knowledge sharing may have relevant eﬀects on
information structures, and thus on individual and collective behaviors. In this paper, we have
proposed a model that can eﬀectively deal with such eﬀects in a very large class of problems.
In particular, our model can be applied, contrary to previous models in the literature on
strategic information revelation, to environments with higher-order uncertainty and several
privately informed decision makers. In addition, our model allows explicit characterizations
of endogenous knowledge structures, along and outside the equilibrium path. As shown, all
properties of a sequential equilibrium are satisﬁed by the knowledge equilibrium, but it is not
necessary to consider perturbed games. Instead, outside equilibrium beliefs are determined
by using natural and consistent interpretations of public revelation choices. Under these
conditions we have seen, however, that traditional knowledge properties may not be satisﬁed,
but remain perfectly manageable. In the following lines we discuss some of our results and
assumptions, especially the assumption that information can be certiﬁed. We also justify and
link our knowledge consistency condition by relying on other studies in the literature. Finally,
we expose various possible extensions.
The Certiﬁability Constraint. A seemingly strong assumption regarding the feature of commu-
nication has been made throughout the paper since we always assumed that players can only
reveal information they possess. Such an assumption may or may not be satisﬁed depending on
the interactive context we want to analyze. We made this assumption so as to be in accordance
with the literature on strategic information revelation. Nevertheless, we do not think that
dropping the truth telling assumption changes substantially our model and our constructions.
The only signiﬁcant change is that certiﬁed information loses all its sense, i.e., the pure infor-
mational content of a message is irrelevant. Technically, this implies that the intersections with
all disclosed events xj 2 Xj by any player j in any state ! must be dropped. In particular, the
30interpretation function should be redeﬁned by I
j
i (c;x;!) ´ Maxifhi(!) \ c¡1
¡j(x¡j) j Hj;ºjg,
i.e., by dropping xj in Equation (4) on page 17. Additionally, we should require that the set
of available messages does not change across states of the world, i.e., X(!) = X(!0) for all !,
!0 2 Ω. In that case, it is easy to see that a non-revealing equilibrium always exists. Indeed,
if Ii = fΩg and ci(!) = Ω for all i 2 N, then Pi(x;!) = I
j
i (c;x;!) = fΩg for all i, j 2 N and
for any deviation x 2 X(c;!), a well known result in the literature on cheap talk games.
Knowledge Consistency. Several comments can be made on the links between our knowledge
consistency condition and Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) belief consistency condition. As seen in
various examples and in the construction of consistent possibility correspondences, the diﬀer-
ences concern the requirement we made on the identiﬁcation of unilateral deviations and on
the restrictions to a ﬁnite set of possible outside equilibrium beliefs. Indeed, we assumed that,
when possible, outside equilibrium disclosures are assigned to a unique deviant, and deviations
of this deviant are associated homogeneously to a set of his information sets compatible with
others’ disclosures and certiﬁed information. Our knowledge consistency conditions could also
be justiﬁed from revision rules used in cognitive science (see, e.g., G¨ ardenfors, 1988). Ac-
tually, along the equilibrium path, the second stage information structure of the associated
continuation Bayesian game is uniquely obtained from a knowledge expansion, since the vector
of messages does not conﬂict with any agent’s initial knowledge and equilibrium expectation.
On the other hand, when a deviation is observed by an agent, second stage information is
obtained from diﬀerent possible knowledge revisions since the agent receives information that
is inconsistent with the expected equilibrium play. This revising process is not uniquely de-
ﬁned because there is no well deﬁned logical rule governing a unique rational belief revision,
albeit some conditions should be required (as those induced by our revision rules RR1–RR4).
When a multitude of beliefs can be logically selected, the literature on rational revisions of
epistemic states consider a central rationality criterion on revisions in that they should be
the minimal changes that accommodate and include the epistemic input (here, an epistemic
input is a vector of messages received from the others). This postulate is motivated by a con-
servativity principle according to which, when changing beliefs in response to new evidence
(in our case, an observable deviation), agents should continue to believe as many of the old
beliefs as possible. In some sense, assigning a deviation to only one player satisﬁes this in-
formational economy criterion since equilibrium interpretations are kept for all other players
(our condition RR5). Finally, the orderings ºj we constructed on each player j’s partition,
as well as the ordering generated by the bijection ½ on the set of agents, could be assimilated
to what is called epistemic entrenchments in that potential deviants and their information
sets are ordered without connection to players’ initial information and the prior probabilities
(G¨ ardenfors, 1988, Chapter 4).
Strategic Delay in Information Disclosures. In many instances each player, before choosing
which information he will disclose, may have an incentive to wait for others’ public revelations.
Such a possibility was not explored in the paper since we considered simultaneous and one-
stage communication. If waiting is a strategic possibility, then a knowledge equilibrium will
remain an equilibrium in our model if each player, after having waited one period, already
want to disclose the same information. This no regret property can be obtained by dropping
the sum over the set of states of the world in the deﬁnition of rational communication of
the knowledge equilibrium (Condition 2 in Deﬁnition 6). In that case, even after a player
waits one period and receives others’ messages, he will continue to rationally disclose his
information according to the same communication strategy. If an equilibrium exists under
this condition, then it is stronger in the sense that it is robust to strategic incentives to wait
others’ information disclosures.
Extensions. By specifying the utility function for some adequate interactive decision situations
31we expect that the model presented here can easily be applied to speciﬁc or stylized economic
problems, as well as to some classes of games. Some possible applications and several examples
are presented in a companion paper (Koessler, 2002). Alternatively, we could eventually
envisage to extend our theoretical analysis to repeated or networked communications. It
could also be interesting to analyze when agents will rationally refuse to participate in some
public revelation meetings, and thus will intentionally neglect some new possible information.
Phenomena of bounded rationality due to a myopic learning or to a problem of information
treatment (not only outside the equilibrium path) may also be envisaged. Another probably
enriching and related research project would be to analyze strategic knowledge sharing without
an equilibrium perspective. This should allow a characterization of endogenous knowledge
structures in some classes of interactive decision situations where, e.g., common knowledge of
rationality is assumed, but others’ information-contingent strategies are initially unknown.
Appendices
A. Sequential Equilibrium of (G;X)
In this section we deﬁne Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) sequential equilibrium of the extensive
form communication game (G;X).
Remark 8 We assume that the set of states of the world Ω is ﬁnite because the sequential
equilibrium does not apply to inﬁnite games. The reason is that if Ω is inﬁnite and countable,
then the set of events an agent can certify may be uncountable (because the set of subsets
of an inﬁnite and countable set is uncountable), and thus it may be impossible to consider
“trembling” strategies assigning a positive probability to each message.
For any i 2 N, remember that Πi is the set of mixed communication strategies of player
i, i.e., the set of Hi measurable functions ¼i : Ω ! ∆(Xi) such that supp(¼i(!)) µ Xi(!) for
all ! 2 Ω. Let ¼(x j !) =
Q
i2N ¼i(xi j !), where x = (xi)i2N 2 X(!) is a vector of certiﬁed
events. Σi is the set of (second (second stage) eﬀective strategies of player i, i.e., the set of
functions ¾i : X £ Ω∆(Ai) such that ¾i(x;!) = ¾i(x;!0) for all ! 2 Ω, !0 2 hi(!) and x 2 X.
Hence, ¾i(ai j x;!) is the probability that player i chooses action ai 2 Ai at ! 2 Ω when
the vector of messages x 2 X(!) µ X has been sent in the communication stage. We have
Σ =
Q
i2N Σi and ¾(a j x;!) =
Q
i2N ¾i(ai j x;!), where a 2 A.
A (second stage) belief of player i on Ω is given by a probability distribution ¹i : X £Ω !
∆(Ω), where ¹i(!0 j x;!) is player i’s belief about !0 when the vector of messages x 2 X(!)
has been sent at !. A system of beliefs is denoted by ¹ = (¹i)i2N.37 An assessment is a
tuple (¾;¼;¹), where ¾ 2 Σ is a proﬁle of eﬀective strategies, ¼ 2 Π is a proﬁle of (mixed)
communication strategies, and ¹ is a system of beliefs. A partial assessment is given by (¼;¹).
Let Π0 be the set of all strictly positive communication strategy proﬁles, i.e., Π0 ´ f¼ 2
Π : ¼(x j !) > 0; 8 ! 2 Ω; 8 x 2 X(!)g.38 If ¼ 2 Π0, then ¹ is associated with ¼ and p via
Bayes’ rule:









!002hi(!) p(!00)¼(x j !00)
otherwise,
(9)
for all ! 2 Ω and x 2 X(!).
37Since every information set belonging to the ﬁrst stage game (before messages are received) is reached with
positive probability, we need only consider belief consistency in the second stage game.
38Notice that ¼ 2 Π
0 implies supp(¼i(!)) = Xi(!) for all ! 2 Ω and i 2 N.
32Let Ψ0 be the set of (partial) assessments (¼;¹) where ¼ 2 Π0 is a strictly positive
communication strategy proﬁle and ¹ is deﬁned from p and ¼ by Bayes’ rule. An assessment
(¾;¼;¹) is consistent if (¼;¹) = limt!1(¼t;¹t) for some sequence f(¼t;¹t)g µ Ψ0.








be player i’s expected utility at the beginning of the second stage game at ! 2 Ω when
x 2 X(!) has been revealed. Let







be player i’s expected utility when he receives his initial information hi(!) at the beginning
of the ﬁrst stage game.
An assessment (¾;¼;¹) is sequentially rational if for all i 2 N, ! 2 Ω, and x 2 X(!) we
have,
Ui(¾;x;¹i;!) ¸ Ui(ai;¾¡i;x;¹i;!); 8 ai 2 Ai;
and for all i 2 N and ! 2 Ω,
EUi(¾;¼;¹i j hi(!)) ¸ EUi(¾;xi;¼¡i;¹i j hi(!)); 8 xi 2 Xi(!):
Finally, a sequential equilibrium of (G;X) is an assessment (¾;¼;¹) which is sequentially
rational and consistent.
B. Additional Lemmas
In this section we show two intuitive but useful lemmas. These lemmas are needed to prove
our theorems. The ﬁrst lemma, used to prove Theorem 2, shows that if a unilateral deviation
x = (x1;:::;xn) 2 X(!) from c 2 C is observable by some player i 2 N at ! 2 Ω, then for all
states !0 2 hi(!) \
T
k2N xk, (i) There exists a potential deviant for player i whose expected
message cj(!0) at !0 diﬀers from its actual message xj, or (ii) There exist two players j and
j0 (not necessarily potential deviants) whose expected messages cj(!0) and cj0(!0) at !0 diﬀer
from their actual messages xj and xj0. The second lemma is a corollary of the ﬁrst one, and
is used to prove Theorem 1. It states that if a unilateral deviation is j-identiﬁable by some
player at !, then player j is eﬀectively the deviant at !.
Lemma 1 Let x 2 X(c;!) be a unilateral deviation from c 2 C at ! 2 Ω which is observable
by some player i 2 N at !. Then, for all !0 2 hi(!) \
T
k2N xk, one or both of the following
properties hold:
(i) There exists j 2 Ni(c;x;!) such that xj 6= cj(!0);
(ii) There exist j, j0 2 N, j 6= j0, such that xj 6= cj(!0) and xj0 6= cj0(!0).
Proof. First note that if Ni(c;x;!) = N, then the result is immediate since the deviation
is observable at !. Indeed, in that case, x 6= c(!0) for all !0 2 hi(!), i.e., there exists j 2 N
such that xj 6= cj(!0); hence, property (i) is satisﬁed. Now, assume that Ni(c;x;!) 6= N. From
the deﬁnition of the set Ni(c;x;!) we have hi(!) \ c¡1
¡l (x¡l) \ xl = ; for all l = 2 Ni(c;x;!).
Let !0 2 hi(!)\
T
k2N xk. This implies that for all l = 2 Ni(c;x;!), there exists j 6= l such that
cj(!0) 6= xj. It is not diﬃcult to verify that this property necessarily implies either (i), or (ii),
or both. ¤
33Lemma 2 If a unilateral deviation x 2 X(c;!) from c 2 C at ! 2 Ω is j-identiﬁable by some
player at !, then xj 6= cj(!) and xk = ck(!) for all k 6= j.
Proof. If a unilateral deviation x from c is j-identiﬁable by player i at !, then Ni(c;x;!) =
fjg. Using the fact that ! 2 hi(!) \
T
k2N xk, Lemma 1 gives xj 6= cj(!) (property (ii) in
Lemma 1 is impossible with !0 = ! since only unilateral deviations are considered). Hence,
we also have xk = ck(!) for all k 6= j because x is a unilateral deviation. ¤
C. Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, we prove that a knowledge equilibrium (see Deﬁnition 6) forms a sequential
equilibrium as described in Appendix A. It is easy to verify that sequential rationality is
satisﬁed in the communication stage and in the second stage game. Indeed, the ﬁrst two
conditions in the deﬁnition of a knowledge equilibrium are equivalent to the conditions of
sequential rationality given in Appendix A. Therefore, we have to show that beliefs associated
with consistent possibility correspondences are consistent in the sense of Kreps and Wilson
(1982) for all unilateral deviations during the communication stage.
Let c 2 C be a pure communication strategy, P = (Pi)i2N a second stage information
structure, and let ¼(c(!) j !) = 1 for all ! 2 Ω. Thus, ¼ 2 Π is the mixed communication
strategy associated with the pure communication strategy c 2 C. For all i 2 N, !, !0 2 Ω,
and x 2 X(!), let ¹i(!0 j x;!) = p(!0 j Pi(x;!)). We show that consistent information
structures can be associated with consistent beliefs in the sense of Kreps and Wilson (1982).
More precisely, if P is consistent with (c;X), then we show that (¾;¼;¹) is consistent at every
information set reachable with at most one unilateral deviation.
Assume that the second stage information structure P = (Pi)i2N is consistent with (c;X),
let (Hj;ºj)j2N be an associated system of orderings over players’ partitions, and let ½ be an
associated bijection over N. We must ﬁnd a sequence of strictly positive proﬁles of strategies
f¼tg µ Π0 such that for all !, !0 2 Ω, i 2 N, and x 2 X(c;!) we have
limt!1 ¼t(c(!) j !) = 1;
and limt!1 ¹t
i(!0 j x;!) = p(!0 j Pi(x;!));
where ¹t is deﬁned from p and ¼t by Bayes’ rule, i.e.,









!002hi(!) p(!00)¼t(x j !00)
; otherwise,
(10)
for all ! 2 Ω and i 2 N. If !0 = 2 hi(!) \
T
k2N xk, then !0 = 2 Pi(x;!) by the certiﬁability
constraint (condition RR1), and thus p(!0 j Pi(x;!)) = 0 = limt!1 ¹t
i(!0 j x;!) by Equa-
tion (10). Therefore, we must ﬁnd a sequence f¼tg µ Π0 such that for all ! 2 Ω, x 2 X(c;!),
i 2 N, and !0 2 hi(!) \
T





!002hi(!) p(!00)¼t(x j !00)











0 if !0 = 2 Pi(x;!)
1
±P
!002Pi(x;!) p(!00) if !0 2 Pi(x;!):
34This last equality is satisﬁed if for all !00 2 Pi(x;!) we have










Note that the fractions given just above are well deﬁned since !00 2 Pi(x;!) ) !00 2 T
k2N xk by the certiﬁability constraint. Hence, x 2 X(!00), which implies that ¼t(x j !00) 6= 0
because ¼t 2 Π0.
Let f"tg µ R be a sequence such that limt!1 "t = 0. To simplify the notations, we drop
the subscript t in "t. For all j 2 N, let I1
j = fh 2 Ij : h ºj h0 8 h0 2 Ijg, I2
j = fh 2 IjnI1
j :
h ºj h0 8 h0 2 IjnI1
jg, I3
j = fh 2 Ijn(I1
j [ I2
j) : h ºj h0 8 h0 2 Ijn(I1
j [ I2
j)g, and so on. For






















For all j 2 N and ! 2 Ω, let lj(!) be the integer l satisfying ! 2 Il
j. Note that we neces-
sarily have lj(!) · jΩj = m. We consider the following proﬁle of “trembling” communication
strategies: For all j 2 N and ! 2 Ω,
¼t






m+1 if xj 6= cj(!), xj 2 Xj(!)
1 ¡ (jXj(!)j ¡ 1)"n"n+1¡½(j)"
lj(!)





j(xj j !) = 1 and limt!1 ¼t
j(cj(!) j !) = 1 for all j 2 N and ! 2 Ω.
We will diﬀerentiate two cases: (1) First we will assume that x is not an observable deviation
for player i at !; this conﬁguration is the simplest one. (2) Second, we will assume that x is an
observable deviation for player i at !. In both cases, we will always assume that !00 2 Pi(x;!)
in order to show that conditions (11) and (12) are satisﬁed. As mentioned before, we also
assume !0 2 hi(!) \
T
k2N xk (otherwise, the result was already proved).
(1) Unobservable Deviation
By deﬁnition, if x is not an observable deviation for player i at !, then Pi(x;!) = hi(!)\
c¡1(x). Hence, !00 2 c¡1(x), i.e., limt!1 ¼t(x j !00) = 1. Similarly, if !0 2 Pi(x;!), then
limt!1 ¼t(x j !0) = 1. In this case, condition (11) is satisﬁed. On the contrary, if !0 = 2 Pi(x;!),
then !0 = 2 c¡1(x),39 which implies that limt!1 ¼t(x j !0) = 0. Thus, condition (12) is also
satisﬁed.
(2) Observable Deviation
Assume that x is an observable deviation from c for player i at !. In this case we have
Pi(x;!) = Maxifhi(!) \ c¡1
¡´(x¡´) \ x´ j H´;º´g, where
´ = Ni(c;x;! j ½) 2 arg max
k2Ni(c;x;!)
½(k):40
If !0, !00 2 Pi(x;!), then !0, !00 2 c¡1
k (xk) for all k 6= ´, and thus xk = ck(!0) = ck(!00)
for all k 6= ´. Therefore, limt!1 ¼t
k(xk j !0) = limt!1 ¼t
k(xk j !00) = 1 for all k 6= ´.
Moreover, since the deviation is observable, x´ 6= c´(!0) and x´ 6= c´(!00).41 Consequently,
39Remember that we assume that !
0 2 hi(!) \
T
k2N xk.
40Of course, if x is a j-identiﬁable deviation for player i at !, then ´ = j.
41Otherwise, !
0 or !
00 belongs to hi(!)\c
¡1(x), a contradiction with the fact that the deviation is observable
(see Deﬁnition 3).
35limt!1 ¼t
´(x´ j !0) = limt!1 ¼t














= 1 since !0, !00 2 Pi(x;!) ) h´(!0) »´ h´(!00) ) l´(!0) = l´(!00).
Now, let !00 2 Pi(x;!) but !0 = 2 Pi(x;!). This last condition implies that either
(a) !0 2 hi(!) \ c¡1
¡´(x¡´) \ x´ but h´(!0) Á´ h´(!00), or
(b) !0 = 2 \c¡1
¡´(x¡´) (and, as usual, !0 2 hi(!) \
T
k2N xk).
If (a), then !0, !00 2 c¡1
k (xk) for all k 6= ´, which implies that limt!1 ¼t
k(xk j !0) =
limt!1 ¼t

































If (b), then there exists k 6= ´ such that ck(!0) 6= xk. Moreover, from Lemma 1, we have
to diﬀerentiate two cases: (i) There exists j 2 Ni(c;x;!) such that cj(!0) 6= xj (j might be
equal to k if Ni(c;x;!) is not a singleton, i.e., if the deviation is not identiﬁable), or (ii) There
exist j, j0 2 N, j 6= j0, such that xj 6= cj(!0) and xj0 6= cj0(!0).
In case (i) we have to distinguish again two subcases: (b’) k 2 Ni(c;x;!), and (b”)
k = 2 Ni(c;x;!). For example, if the deviation is j-identiﬁable, we necessarily have j = ´,
and thus k = 2 Ni(c;x;!) (subcase (b”)), which implies that j 6= k. In both subcases, we get
limt!1 ¼t
k(xk j !0) = limt!1 ¼t
























m+1 < 1. Under condition
































Finally, assume that (ii) holds. In that case, we can take j 6= k, and thus we can apply
the same reasoning as in subcase (b”).
Since a knowledge equilibrium is associated with consistent beliefs and with communica-
tion and eﬀective strategies which are sequentially rational, a knowledge equilibrium forms a
sequential equilibrium. This completes the proof.
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